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                                        ABSTRACT 
This thesis attempts to assess the role Africa has played to further the humanitarian approach to 
nuclear weapons disarmament. Particular focus is on the Pelindaba Treaty and whether it has 
been able to strengthen the call for disarmament based on the humanitarian approach. 
The findings of this research are that the Pelindaba treaty did contribute indirectly to the 
strengthening of the humanitarian initiative of nuclear weapons disarmament because the Treaty 
serves as an important contribution towards the achievement of a world without nuclear 
weapons, which is the key objective of the humanitarian initiative of nuclear weapons 
disarmament. In addition, the Pelindaba Treaty has also contributed in strengthening the call for 
overall nuclear disarmament. This is the case as 53 states signed the treaty to rid the continent of 
nuclear weapons and any direct threats associated with those weapons. In so doing, it has 
contributed greatly to disarmament efforts. A nuclear weapons free zone across the continent is a 
powerful statement about the desire for a nuclear free world. It has provided African states with a 
foundation for engaging in the humanitarian initiative, as it led to some standardisation of 
statements/positions. 
Also, since the inception of the humanitarian approach to disarmament, African states have 
contributed greatly to the initiative. In terms of numbers, in the three conferences on the 
humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons use that have taken place between 2013 and 2014 (in 
Oslo, Nayarit and Vienna), it was witnessed that the number of participating African states 
increased from 34 in the first meeting to 45 in the last meeting. This alone indicates the 
determination and commitment by these African states to the initiative. 
Conclusively, this research determined that the Pelindaba Treaty and efforts of African states in 
general have contributed  towards strengthening the call for not only the humanitarian initiative 
to nuclear weapons disarmament but also to disarmament overall. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction  
On the international stage, nuclear weapons have often been regarded as a sign of status and 
power. This has resulted in some states making efforts to acquire nuclear weapons while those 
states that already have nuclear weapons are unwilling to give these weapons up despite the 
severe humanitarian consequences that are associated with their use. Nuclear weapons are the 
most dangerous, destructive and inhumane weapons that have ever been created. Not only do 
they have the potential of killing millions of people, but they also have devastating global 
consequences such as: severely negative environmental impacts including global climate change, 
widespread famine and heritably damaging radioactive effects years after their use (Rydell 
2012). 
Due to this, over the years, there has been an increase in the call for nuclear non-proliferation 
and disarmament by both state and non-state actors. Various agreements and treaties have been 
negotiated to combat the spread of nuclear weapons, such as the African Nuclear Weapon Free 
Zone Treaty: The Pelindaba Treaty which came in effect in 2009, making the African continent a 
Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ). This thesis aims to determine to what extent the 
Pelindaba Treaty has contributed to the cause of nuclear disarmament around the globe. The 
focus of the research is on the humanitarian approach that has been adopted by some advocates 
of nuclear disarmament, who place the importance of securing human lives and livelihoods over 
that of status and power. As such, the thesis aims, in particular, to establish how African states 
have contributed to this initiative by creating a nuclear weapon free zone. 
 
1.2 Background to the Study 
 
Despite numerous disarmament efforts, 15375 nuclear weapons still exists to date (Ploughshares 
Fund, 2016) with no sign of those states with nuclear weapons ready to give them up any time 
soon. Borrie and Caughley (2013, p. 2) note that “there is considerable frustration among non-
nuclear-weapon states at the conspicuous absence of progress towards nuclear disarmament in 
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multilateral forums, and at the difficulties they face in influencing the nuclear-weapon states to 
reduce reliance on these arms.” Over the years the focus has been on non-proliferation rather 
than total elimination of existing nuclear weapons. For as long as some states are still in 
possession of these weapons, other states will also feel the need to acquire similar weapons not 
only as a defence mechanism but also for the sake of acquiring power and status that is 
associated with the possession of nuclear weapons. 
 
One of the steps towards disarmament has been that of creating NWFZs. This means that some 
states and regions have taken the initiative of giving up the option of having nuclear weapons, 
thus improving regional, national and international peace and security by lessening the risk of 
nuclear attack. This not only demonstrates that states can be secure without nuclear weapons, but 
it also shows that the entire world can be more secure if it was free of nuclear weapons.  
 
The Pelindaba Treaty ensures the safety of the African continent from nuclear attack in that 
signatory states would use nuclear technology for civilian purposes only and not for military 
purposes. The Treaty also argues for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The 
Pelindaba Treaty and other NWFZ treaties, such as the Rarotonga Treaty (of the South Pacific 
region) have been an important and concrete contribution to the nuclear disarmament regime. 
This study will assess the contribution that Africa has made in terms of disarmament and 
evaluate if the African NWFZ Treaty has made any significant contribution to the strengthening 
of the humanitarian initiative of disarmament. 
 
1.3 Research question and hypothesis  
 
The purpose of this research is to assess Africa’s contribution to nuclear disarmament. 
Specifically, the research question focuses by way of a case study, on the contribution that 
African states made to the humanitarian initiative to nuclear disarmament by establishing a 
NWFZ through concluding the Pelindaba Treaty. Thus, the following research question serves to 
guide the investigation: 
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How has Africa contributed to nuclear disarmament? In particular, how has the Pelindaba Treaty 
contributed towards the so-called humanitarian approach to nuclear weapons disarmament? 
 
As the above question aims to describe Africa’s contribution, the following sub-questions are 
structured to help answer the research question: 
 
What is Africa’s position in the global nuclear order? 
What is the history of Africa’s nuclear weapons disarmament, especially the history of the 
Pelindaba Treaty? 
What is the humanitarian approach to nuclear disarmament? 
What is the African contribution to current nuclear disarmament discourse and praxis (especially 
the discourse and praxis evolving around the humanitarian approach)? 
 
The hypothesis is that the Treaty has helped to directly strengthen the humanitarian initiative of 
nuclear disarmament discursively, drawing on language in the Treaty that is associated with 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL), as well as in practice by reversing nuclear deterrence 
logic (mutually assured deterrence) to that of mutually assured abstinence. 
 
1.4 Research rationale /significance 
 
It is important to recognise the contribution made by Africa towards nuclear disarmament. Not 
only does it provide lessons for other regions to follow suit, but it also shows the need for 
urgency in the nuclear order. There is now a greater need to focus on the humanitarian 
consequences of nuclear weapons because it offers the potential to appeal to a wider set of 
audiences throughout society as it focuses on the real consequences of weapon detonation. This 
humanitarian initiative could change the mind sets of people as it appeals more to ethics than 
prestige. Therefore, it could be a successful contribution to the strengthening of the disarmament 
appeal where other initiatives have failed. 
 
Nuclear weapons are not often regarded as a security concern for African states and yet the 
consequences of nuclear weapons use will have global humanitarian consequences and therefore 
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remains an important issue for all states, including African states (Laursen 2012). In addition, 
nuclear weapons proliferation and disarmament remain multilateral foreign policy and geo-
political issues on the international stage. Hence, African states cannot avoid taking a position in 
nuclear matters. The Pelindaba Treaty is a key instrument in African nuclear relations, which 
builds on African history in the global nuclear order. As such, an analysis of the Treaty can 
provide valuable insights into Africa’s contribution to nuclear disarmament, especially how the 
African discourse on nuclear weapons relates to the humanitarian approach.   
 
1.5 Literature Review 
 
This section presents a literature review, describing the key concepts associated with the above 
research topic. Literature is reviewed under the following headings: nuclear weapons, 
international humanitarian law, nuclear disarmament, humanitarian approach and liberal 
institutionalism.  
 
 
1.5.1 Nuclear weapons 
 
The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) (n.d) describes nuclear weapons 
as “the most dangerous weapons on earth. One nuclear weapon can destroy a whole city, 
potentially killing millions, and jeopardizing the natural environment and lives of future 
generations through its long-term catastrophic effects.” There are eight states that have nuclear 
weapons, namely the United States (US), Russia, the United Kingdom (UK), France, China, 
Pakistan, India and North Korea. Other countries may have nuclear weapons or are working 
towards acquiring them, most notably Israel. On the African continent, South Africa had nuclear 
weapons and has since disarmed, whereas Libya was also reported to have plans to develop the 
capacity of producing nuclear weapons, but never got as far as having nuclear weapons.  
 
Nuclear weapons, also known as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), have only been used 
twice in history (the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the US) in 1945. Nevertheless, their 
effects are still felt today. The dangers from such weapons arise from their very existence and as 
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a result nuclear weapons introduce more insecurity than security to the international system, 
especially viewed from the side of human security. Furthermore, Hanson (2002, p. 1) argues that 
“nuclear weapons serve no useful purpose in military calculations; moreover, their continued 
retention invites the dangers of further proliferation and of accidental use. They are thus defined 
as obstacles to, rather than as facilitators of, international security.” 
 
1.5.2 International Humanitarian Law  
 
International Law also plays a crucial part in achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament. The 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) defines International Humanitarian Law 
(IHL), which is part of International Law, as “a set of rules which seek, for humanitarian reasons, 
to limit the effects of armed conflict. It protects persons who are not or are no longer 
participating in the hostilities and restricts the means and methods of warfare.” States need to 
adapt to and put this law into effect in order to achieve international peace and security. 
Moreover, with respect to nuclear weapons, IHL can also serve as a step towards disarmament 
because of the nature of these weapons.  
 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1996 assessed the effects of a detonated nuclear 
weapon (such as the blast, radiation fall out, the heat) and evaluated that the effects were 
uncontrollable. Therefore when subjecting nuclear weapons to IHL, it was found to use nuclear 
weapons would have effects contrary to some of the rules of IHL (Granoff & Granoff 2011, p. 
55). Nuclear weapons violate certain principles of IHL such as their inability to discriminate 
between targets and civilians, they cause unnecessary suffering and they lead to indescribable 
deaths (Thürer 2011, p. 112). Although the Court could not conclude that the use or threat of use 
of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme case of self-defence where the 
survival of a state is at stake, it advised states to pursue in good faith negotiations that would lead 
to disarmament (Granoff & Granoff 2011, p. 55). 
 
1.5.3 Nuclear disarmament  
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One of the most important issues on the international security agenda is that of nuclear 
disarmament. There is need for states to commit to nuclear disarmament as part of efforts of 
strengthening international security, preventing nuclear weapons proliferation and also as a 
means of confronting nuclear terrorism (Podvig 2012, p. 1). This study will use the term nuclear 
disarmament as simply the act of complete nuclear weapons elimination as opposed to so-called 
arms control, which originated in the Cold War to limit nuclear weapons, but not abolish them 
(Sauer & Pretorius 2014). Disarmament is the best protection against dangers associated with 
nuclear weapons; yet, it has been an extremely difficult challenge to achieve. Conversely, Podvig 
(2012, p. 2) further notes that “the experience that has been gained in the nuclear disarmament 
process so far demonstrates that there are no fundamental technical or political reasons that 
would make progress towards comprehensive disarmament impossible.” This means that a future 
without nuclear weapons is possible. 
 
 
1.5.4 Humanitarian approach to nuclear disarmament 
 
The humanitarian approach to disarmament is one of the initiatives that have been adopted as a 
way of tackling nuclear disarmament. This approach focuses on the humanitarian impact 
associated with the use of nuclear weapons. This approach is led by notions of protecting 
members of the public from particular and tenacious harm and suffering due to such weapons by 
looking at the actual consequences of a detonated nuclear weapon. “Humanitarian approaches to 
disarmament work from the logic of positive sum games, offering benefits for everyone, in 
contrast to the alternative zero sum game of competitive power politics in a world of nation state 
winners and losers” (Rydell 2012). Seeing nuclear weapons use through a humanitarian 
perspective, as was the case with landmines and cluster munitions, could also help governments 
to set aside their differences that obstruct them from making any meaningful and collective 
progress (Borrie & Caughley 2013, p. 2). 
 
1.5.5 Liberal Institutionalism 
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Liberal institutionalism according to Devitt (2011) “argues that emphasis should be placed on 
global governance and international organizations as a way of explaining international relations. 
Institutionalism places emphasis on the role that common goals play in the international system 
and the ability of international organizations to get states to cooperate.” Nuclear disarmament is 
a common goal for most (if not all) states in efforts of achieving international peace and security. 
Disarmament efforts require input from not only from state actors, but also international 
institutions that ensures/monitors that states cooperate to achieve nuclear disarmament goals.  
Moreover, it is not only state actors that call for nuclear disarmament especially on humanitarian 
grounds, it’s also the efforts of international institutions that drive the disarmament agenda with 
the final goal of ensuring international peace, security and cooperation. 
Furthermore, Devitt (2011) highlights that liberal institutionalism also argues “ that in order for 
there to be peace in international affairs states must cooperate together and in effect yield some 
of their sovereignty to create ‘integrated communities’ to promote economic growth and respond 
to regional and international security issues”. Therefore, there is need for commitment by states 
to the liberal institutionalism theory as this contributes towards securing regional and 
international security. 
 
 
1.6 Research methodology and design 
 
The research method used is the descriptive method which attempts to “describe systematically a 
situation, problem, phenomenon, service or programme, or provides information about, say, 
living condition of a community, or in this case it describes attitudes towards an issue” (Kumer 
2011, p. 31). The data gathering method is qualitative in nature which consisted of reviewing 
various secondary sources of information such as books, journals and newspaper articles, that 
gave an overview of the current situation in terms of nuclear disarmament, as well as primary 
sources through conducting in-depth interviews with selected Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs) officials, academics and a government representative (which will be discussed in the 
research plan). 
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The research investigation focused on a single case study. A case can typically be anything from 
a person, an entity such as a classroom, a country and in this case the Pelindaba Treaty. Rule and 
John (2011, p. 3) state that “a case study is a particular instance …, a circumstance or problem 
that requires investigation”, thus offering a better understanding of the case since more details 
will be extracted. Case study research, Shields (n.d) also notes, “Is a research method which 
allows for an in-depth examination of events, phenomena, or other observations within a real-life 
context for purposes of investigation, theory development and testing, or simply as a tool for 
learning.” This research method is used to narrow down a very broad field of research into one 
easily researchable topic, in this case the contribution made by the Pelindaba Treaty to the 
humanitarian approach to nuclear disarmament. 
1.7 Data collection methods 
Two forms of primary data gathering were used: In-depth interviews and data collected from 
speeches and official documents, e.g. the Pelindaba Treaty text. Document analysis was used as 
the third form of data gathering method. This secondary data collection method used literature on 
the topics of IHL, African law, policies and historical sources, such as books, journal articles and 
newspaper articles. The use of multiple methods and sources of data in research is used to 
triangulate data and corroborate the findings, which also provides more credibility for the 
findings so that the researcher may not be accused of relying on a single source or method or 
being biased.  
In-depth interviews are a useful qualitative data collection technique that can be used for a 
variety of purposes. In-depth interviews according to Cook (2008, p. 423), “are interviews in 
which participants are encouraged and prompted to talk in depth about the topic under 
investigation without the researcher's use of predetermined, focused, short-answer questions.” 
Chilisa (2012, p. 205) identified three ways in which interview questions are structured, i.e. the 
unstructured interview that starts with a general question in the study area and interviewer asks 
questions in any order depending on the answers, the semi structured interview which focuses on 
the issue to be covered where the sequence is different for every participant, and finally the 
structured interview that has a schedule containing a number of pre-planned questions and 
participants are asked the same questions in the same order. For the purpose of this research, the 
researcher conducted a semi structured interview which has questions contained in an interview 
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guide that ensures that the researcher collects similar types of data from all informants. However, 
as the questions were open-ended, they provided room for asking follow-up questions outside the 
guideline (Cook 2008). 
“Document analysis is a systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents—both 
printed and electronic (computer-based and Internet-transmitted) material” (Bowen 2009). 
Document analysis is conducted in order to gain information and understanding and to develop 
empirical knowledge. These documents may be in the form of words (text) or pictures and may 
include adverts, meeting agendas, meeting minutes, attendance registers, letters, books, journals, 
diaries, maps, newspapers, etc.  Document analysis simply means taking the raw data from these 
sources and then organising it into specific themes or categories in order to make sense of it. 
Document analysis is useful in qualitative case studies that require intensive in-depth 
understanding of a phenomenon, organisation, event or a program and in this case the Pelindaba 
Treaty.  In this case documents such as mission statements and minutes from the meetings taken 
during the drafting of the Treaty provided the context within which the Treaty exists.  
 
1.8 Research plan 
 
The data gathered was from three different sources (data triangulation). Firstly the views of 
sources that specialise in IHL were collected. Secondly, data was collected by looking at the 
views of sources that specialise in nuclear weapons and disarmament. Finally, input from those 
that have a perspective on the African contribution (especially by the Pelindaba Treaty) was also 
collected. 
 
Interviewees from Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and the South African Department 
of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) helped in giving insight to Africa’s 
influence in this area. Two NGO representatives were interviewed. The reason why NGOs were 
selected as participants is because over the years they have played a key role in bringing various 
disarmament efforts to governments and also to the attention of the public. These NGOs ranged 
from those that deal with International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and those that advocate 
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disarmament. Four NGOs were approached: the Institute of Security Studies (ISS) that has done 
extensive research on the topic of Africa’s role in disarmament and Mr Noel Stott was the key 
contact person there. The African Council of Churches that was at the fore in pushing for the 
signing of the Pelinda Treaty. The ICRC that has dealt with humanitarian issues for many years 
around the globe, emphasising on the enormous suffering that would result from the use of 
nuclear weapons and the contact person was Sarah Swart who is the Regional and Legal Advisor 
of the organization. Finally, the International Law and Policy Institute (ILPI) where the contact 
person was Mr Torbjorn Graff Hugo, the Project Leader in WMD Project for the institute who 
has extensive expertise in areas of good governance, peace and conflict, human rights, and 
international law. However, the researcher was only able to get information from two of the four: 
ILPI and ICRC. The DIRCO proved to be a good source of information as it is the government 
department responsible for South Africa’s participation in nuclear matters. The researcher was 
able to interview the Deputy Director in Biological, Chemical, Missile and Arms Control, Mr 
Michiel Combrink. 
1.9 Research ethics 
 
Ethics has been defined by Remenyi et al (2011, p. 1) as “a branch of philosophy which 
addresses issues of human conduct related to a sense of what is right and what is wrong and as 
such it may be regarded as a society’s code of moral conduct.” The researcher therefore, 
followed the necessary ethical procedures of conducting research, which involved the drafting of 
three documents of which two were issued out to research participants. The first document was a 
Research Participants Document which Remenyi et al (2011, p. 123) describe as having the 
purpose of explaining the role that the possible informant will play in the research. This 
document consisted of the description of the study, what it involved, why the participants have 
been asked to participate, information guaranteeing confidentiality and anonymity amongst other 
assurances. Also, a letter of informed consent was issued which participants signed after 
agreeing to the terms set out in the Research Participants Document. By signing, they indicated 
that they voluntarily agreed to take part in the research project. Finally a letter of consent to 
record the interview was also drafted assuring that the records, once the transcript has been 
created will be erased. However, as all communication with participants was done via email, this 
document was disregarded. 
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1.10 Limitations and challenges of the study 
 
One major challenge of the study was the access to information. The researcher was unable to 
find information to establish a direct link that the drafting and signing of the Pelindaba Treaty 
was a result of humanitarian concerns that states party to the Treaty had. Another limitation 
pertaining to information was the geographic location of the researcher. The research topic 
focuses on Africa’s contribution, but the researcher is geographically limited to South Africa. 
Although email correspondence was used to interview informants, the researcher was unable to 
secure any interviews with state officials outside South Africa. Also, as most organisations that 
deal with the humanitarian aspect of nuclear disarmament are not located in Cape Town or South 
Africa where the researcher is based, it was difficult to set up face-to-face interviews with these 
organisations. Even though the geographic limitation could have impacted the findings of the 
research as in-depth interviews were only conducted on representatives of a small segment of the 
African region-which might not be a full reflection of the African view. This, was however 
rectified, through data triangulation where various governments’ views on the matter were 
extracted from a wide range of primary and secondary sources thus making the research 
arguments well evidenced. 
 
 
1.11 Structure of thesis  
 
The thesis consists of the following chapters: 
 
Chapter one 
Introduction: this chapter offers a background to the study as well as an outline of the research 
design and the methods used to carry out the research. 
 
Chapter Two 
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History and nature of nuclear weapons: emphasis in this chapter will be on the history of nuclear 
weapons, the measures that are in place at present to secure nuclear order, as well as the possible 
events that could lead to nuclear disorder. 
 
Chapter Three 
This chapter focuses on Africa and nuclear weapons. It offers a background analysis on the 
history Africa has had with nuclear weapons as well as the current position of the continent and 
the role it plays in matters relating to nuclear weapons. Also, the Pelindaba Treaty will be looked 
at as it was a measure undertaken by African states to secure the continent from nuclear threats. 
 
Chapter Four 
Nuclear weapons disarmament and the humanitarian approach: This chapter will outline all the 
efforts that are underway to tackle disarmament as well as an analysis of nuclear weapons 
disarmament on humanitarian grounds. The attention will be on efforts by African states at 
humanitarian approach to disarmament. 
 
Chapter Five 
This chapter provides the analysis and findings of the study: The focus will be on whether the 
Pelindaba Treaty contributed to strengthening of the humanitarian approach and a discussion of 
other outcomes. 
 
Chapter Six 
Conclusion and recommendations: this concluding chapter summarises the key findings of the 
research. It reviews the answers that were established for the stated research questions as well as 
provide recommendations based on the findings, and avenues for further study. 
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Chapter Two: History and Nature of Nuclear Weapons 
 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter will focus on the historic background of nuclear weapons and global efforts for 
nuclear order to sketch the context in which the research question has significance. To start off, 
the chapter will give an overview of nuclear weapons. This will be followed by a look at the 
origins of nuclear weapons from the first discovery of nuclear fission to the first use of nuclear 
weapons. Thereafter, the chapter will highlight the period after the discovery of nuclear weapons 
where there was a spread of nuclear weapons, labelled “nuclear arms race.” That will be 
followed by a discussion of the various efforts that have been carried out to ensure global nuclear 
order by looking at a number of treaties that are in place to address the problem of nuclear 
weapons. Finally the chapter will look at the various factors that pose as elements that will lead 
to possible future nuclear disorder if nuclear weapons elimination is not achieved.  
 
2.2 Nuclear Weapons  
Nuclear weapons, also known as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), are powerful explosive 
devices in the form of bombs or missiles that use nuclear energy to cause an explosion. They are 
some of the most devastating weapons of war ever created. One nuclear bomb has the potential 
of killing hundreds of thousands of people as well as wiping out an entire city (Nuclear and 
Conventional Weapons, n.d). Williams (2012, p. 335) highlights that “it is estimated that to 
destroy civilisation globally, fifty would be sufficient.” This illustrates the destructive nature of 
these nuclear weapons and the potential they have of completely wiping out the entire world. 
Nuclear weapons have only been used twice in warfare history, namely the US bombing of the 
Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 (UNODA n.d).  
Nuclear weapons were an innovation of a few powerful states in a period where these states were 
seeking a superior position in global politics. At the height of the arms race, being in possession 
of nuclear weapons was seen as a statement of political and military superiority. Being in 
possession of nuclear weapons meant political power as those states with such weapons were 
respected and feared on the international stage. The original idea behind nuclear weapons was 
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that a state would be able to defend itself in an event of war, however during the Cold War the 
doctrine of nuclear deterrence was developed, and some argued that nuclear weapons are why 
those states has gone to war. As a result of their destructive nature, those nuclear weapons states 
rather resort to negotiations than going to war with each other for fear of mutual destruction 
(Coleman 2002). This doctrine is however questionable since India and Pakistan have gone to 
war (the Kargil War of 1999) despite being in possession of nuclear weapons. 
As stated previously that nine states are believed to have nuclear weapons; this resulted in a 
tremendous increase in the number of nuclear weapons over the years since they were first used. 
The current nuclear arsenals that the US and Russia have in their possession are eight to forty 
times more lethal than those first used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and between them they 
possess about 95 percent of the total of all known nuclear weapons (Magnarella 2008, p. 507). 
Additionally, Swart (2013, p. 196) notes “37 states are implicated in the potential use of 
warheads, whether they be possessing states, host states, or states part of nuclear alliances.” This 
makes the “nuclear issue” an issue involving many states even those that do not directly possess 
nuclear weapons. 
Even though nuclear weapons have not been used since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, over the years, 
there have been many incidents where state leaders such as US Presidents Johnson, Kennedy and 
Eisenhower as well as Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev had seriously considered using nuclear 
weapons (Magnarella 2008, p. 508). This shows that for as long as these weapons exist, there is a 
possibility of them being used on mankind with devastating outcomes.  
 
2.3 The birth of nuclear weapons: 1940-1945 
The years 1940-45 can be viewed as the fundamental years to the birth of nuclear weapons. 
These were the years during the Second World War and were characterised as the race for the 
atomic bomb. There was a lot of activity during this period in terms of the discovery of atomic 
fission to the manufacturing of the first nuclear bomb, its testing and finally the world’s first 
encounter of a nuclear weapon explosion in Hiroshima in 1945. 
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2.3.1 Discovery of atomic fission 
There are a number of scientists that made the breakthrough in nuclear technology, among the 
first were Rudolf Peierls and Otto Frisch who discovered a way of using uranium 235 as a 
crucial component in the process of making nuclear weapons. Their discovery was motivated by 
the fear of Hitler invading Britain as well as fear of Hitler being the first to possess nuclear 
weapons through the efforts of scientists like themselves working for Germany. The reasons they 
made their discoveries known was due to the fact that they being Jews, had fled from Hitler and 
sought refuge in Britain at a time when Germany was advancing on Europe after defeating 
Poland. This meant that there was a possibility of Germany invading Britain, their only refuge at 
that time. They were driven by the fear of Hitler being armed with atomic bombs and they 
argued that the only defence would be if Britain was to be first in possession of such weapons 
which could then act as a deterrent (Arnold 2003, p. 112-115).  
According to the Nuclear Weapons Archive (1997) the invention and discovery of the atomic 
bomb took the efforts of many scientists both in Europe and the US. It was a combination of 
discoveries of the neutron in the early 1920s, the chain reaction process-fission in the 1930s and 
that of uranium 235 and 238 in the late 1930s as necessary components in the process of making 
an atomic bomb. From the early 1940s, efforts were made to actually manufacturing the bomb. 
There are different kinds of nuclear weapons but the most common ones are the fission and the 
fusion nuclear weapons. The fission, also known as the atomic bomb, is a type of nuclear 
weapon whose explosive yield is entirely from fission reactions as its energy derives from the 
nucleus of the atom, hence the name atomic bomb. On the other hand, the fusion weapon also 
known as the hydrogen bomb produces a great section of its energy in nuclear fusion reactions 
and it relies on fusion reactions between elements of hydrogen, hence the name hydrogen bomb 
(CTBO, n.d). 
 
2.3.2 The manufacturing of the atomic bomb and the first testing 
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As stated earlier, what started off as a race to beat Nazi German scientists to the bomb led to the 
birth of one of the most destructive weapons ever created. Two European scientists; Albert 
Einstein and his Hungarian colleague Leo Szilard, wrote a letter in October of 1939 to convince 
the then President of the US Franklin Roosevelt of the need to join in the race of the atomic 
bomb. With Roosevelt’s approval, the Manhattan project was launched. This project involved the 
recruitment of thousands of scientists, engineers and workers coming together to find ways of 
creating the first nuclear bomb which took a period of over four years with the help of the 
governments of Canada and Britain (Nobelprize.org. n.d). 
During this four year period, a lot of research was conducted on the use of uranium and 
plutonium components as necessary for manufacturing a bomb as well as the use of uranium as a 
source of energy, the actual process development, engineering design, procurement of materials 
and the selection of a location for experimental plants. The outcome of this enormous work, with 
aid from the British teams, was that adequate Plutonium (Pu-239) and highly enriched Uranium 
(U-235) was produced by mid-1945 (Nobelprize.org. n.d; World Nuclear Association 2014a). 
The uranium mostly originated from Africa in the Belgian Congo now called the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (Dasnois 2012; World Nuclear Association 2014a). After this, the first 
ever nuclear weapons were manufactured during that same period by mid-1945. 
The history of nuclear weapons testing started in 1945 when on July 16th the US exploded the 
first nuclear bomb in Alamogordo, New Mexico under the code name Trinity. The powerful 
outcome of this first test surprised even those that had contributed to the manufacture of the 
weapon as the effects of the weapon exceeded their expectations. After this first testing, other 
states also carried out similar tests with the Soviet Union on August 29, 1949; then Britain on 
October 3, 1952; followed by France on December 3, 1960 and China on October 16, 1964. 
Thousands of tests have been conducted worldwide since then (Moorthy 2006, p. 01). 
2.3.3 Events leading to the first use of nuclear weapons. 
Even though the original plan was to beat Hitler to the atomic bomb and also to use the bomb if 
there was a possible attack by Germany, it turned out that by the time the testing of the first 
nuclear weapon took place, Germany had already surrendered. This therefore meant that the 
possible threat of a German atomic bomb attack no longer existed. However, in other regions of 
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the Pacific; the war was still on going (Nobelprize.org. n.d). On December 8, 1941 the US 
declared war on Japan following the bombing of Pearl Harbor by a Japanese Naval Task Force 
on December 7 
 
, 1941. Three years into the war on July 26, 1945 the Potsdam declaration was made where the 
US, Britain and China gave Japan the ultimatum to surrender or face complete and utter 
destruction. Following Japan’s initial rejection to surrender, US president Truman ordered the 
newly manufactured nuclear weapons to be used on Japanese cities (Bombing of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki 2009; Nobelprize.org. n.d).  
On August 6, 1945 the first ever nuclear weapon called “Little Boy” was detonated on the city of 
Hiroshima and three days later on August 9 another weapon called “fat man” was detonated on 
the Japanese city of Nagasaki (Borrie & Caughley 2014; Nobelprize.org. n.d). “The accounts of 
what those two bombs did to the cities and their inhabitants are horrifying. About 100,000 people 
in Hiroshima suffered torturous deaths from severe burns. Their skin peeled away from their 
flesh; their eyes were melted, leaving empty sockets. About 60,000 died from lethal doses of 
radiation. Both cities were largely contaminated and destroyed” (Magnarella 2008, p. 507). Five 
days later on August 15, 1945 Japan surrendered, resulting in the end of the Second World War. 
Five years after the detonation of these two nuclear weapons, it is reported that as many as 
340,000 people or  rather 54 percent of the original inhabitants of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, had 
died from the two detonations (Nobelprize.org: n.d). 
In the years that followed, the US, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), Britain and other 
countries embarked on efforts to develop, manufacture, test and modernise their nuclear 
weapons, a period referred to, by some, as the nuclear age. 
 
2.4  The spread of nuclear weapons: 1945-1968 (The nuclear age) 
As from 1945 onwards, the US fear of its vulnerability to a Soviet missile attack increased; 
hence the fast pace of technological breakthroughs in nuclear weapons technology. US nuclear 
weapons acquisitions were mainly triggered by the fear of others getting to them before they did. 
 
 
 
 
18 
 
The fear was that if American scientists were able to create a certain weapon then so could the 
Soviet Union and they were not wrong (Jameson 2013). Thus nuclear arms race ensued between 
the US and the USSR.  
 
2.4.1 Nuclear arms race 
During the nuclear arms race between the US and USSR strategists were deployed to find ways 
and means of developing more efficient weapons than those first used on Japan. The race 
consisted of the US trying to monopolise on nuclear technology and to find means of preventing 
a possible attack by the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the states in the Soviet Union were 
busy trying to find ways to match and exceed the nuclear technology capabilities of the US 
(Rowen 2004, p. 1). 
 
Figure 1: Estimated worldwide nuclear warheads, 2013 
 
 
The years 1945-49 were regarded as the first few years of the atomic age. Figure 1 (Kristensen & 
Norris 2013) indicates the total inventory of the nine Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) as of 2013, 
to date, 15375 nuclear weapons exist (Ploughshares Fund, 2016). The US during this period 
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proved to be supreme in nuclear weapons technology as they were the first and only state to have 
manufactured, tested and used a nuclear weapon. After the end of the Second World War the US 
went on to manufacture the hydrogen bomb which was much more superior and more destructive 
than the atomic bombs that were used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Atomic archives n.d). 
According to the United Nations (n.d.), the US conducted 1,032 nuclear weapons tests between 
1945 and 1992 and it is believed that the US has produced more than 66 500 warheads since 
1945 but this number has reduced drastically after having to disassemble almost 59 000 of those 
weapons (Kristensen & Norris 2013, p. 77). 
The Soviet Union can credit its early nuclear weapons knowledge to information gathered by its 
spies who worked on the Manhattan project.  After the end of Second World War, the Soviet 
Union started working on their nuclear weapons program. They began constructing their own 
nuclear bomb which closely resembled the US’s “Fat Man” as they had used detailed design 
descriptions from its spies who were working on the US project. On August, 29, 1949 the 
Soviets Union conducted its first atomic bomb test in Kazakhstan to the shock of many around 
the world (Atomic archives n.d). In the years that followed, the Soviet Union went on to 
manufacture an estimated 55 000 nuclear weapons. However, as of the year 2013, it was 
recorded to be in possession of approximately 8 500 warheads (Kristensen & Norris 2013, p. 79) 
and carried out 715 tests between 1949 and 1990 (United Nation n.d). From the years 1978 to 
2001, the Soviet Union surpassed the US in the number of warheads in their possession to a point 
that in 1986 it is estimated that the Soviet Union had about 40 159 nuclear weapons stockpile 
while the US had 23 317 weapons (Kristensen & Norris 2013, p. 78). 
Britain, even though not the first state to produce nuclear weapons, was the first to explore the 
development of nuclear weapons. It was through the work by scientists Otto Frisch and Rudolf 
Peierls in February 1940, who at that time lived in Britain that showed the feasibility of fission 
weapons as well as British scientists being among some of the major contributors of the 
Manhattan project (Arnold 2003, p. 112). Even though Britain helped in the production of the 
first ever nuclear weapon, Britain did not independently possess a nuclear weapon. Therefore, in 
early 1947, plans were underway for the development of a British nuclear weapon. However, it 
took them almost five years to produce a nuclear weapon and they detonated their first ever 
atomic bomb on October 13, 1952 on the Monte Bello Island west coast of Australia and their 
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hydrogen bomb was tested five years later November 1957 on Christmas Island on the west coast 
of the Pacific (Atomic Archives, n.d). It is estimated that since its first testing, Britain has 
produced approximately 1 250 warheads but as of 2013 it had reduced its stockpile to an 
estimated 225 nuclear weapons (Kristensen & Norris 2013, p. 79) and between 1952 and 1991 it 
carried out 45 nuclear weapons tests (United Nations n.d). 
France embarked on its nuclear weapons program shortly after the Second World War. However, 
due to domestic political factors, France was only able to carry out its first test of a plutonium 
fuelled nuclear weapon device on February 13, 1960 in the African region of Algeria (Atomic 
Archive, n.d). The United Nations (n.d) notes that “France carried out 210 tests between 1960 
and 1996” and as of 2013, France is estimated to have 300 nuclear warheads in its stockpile, a 
decrease in number from the approximate 1 260 warheads it is believed to have produced since 
its first testing (Kristensen & Norris 2013, p. 79). Even though France reduced the number of 
nuclear weapons in its possession, it still continues to modernise its current nuclear weapons 
(just like other NWS) and still remains the third most powerful NWS in terms of its nuclear 
arsenal (Atomic Archive n.d). 
The Atomic Archive (n.d) asserts that China began its nuclear weapons program in the late 1950s 
with the help of the Soviet Union. A secret agreement was signed between the two states 
whereby China provided the Soviet Union with uranium ore, a key component in the 
manufacture of nuclear weapons and in return, the Soviet Union would assist China with the 
development of its nuclear technology. On October 16, 1964 China conducted its first nuclear 
weapons test involving an atomic bomb and in June 1967 it conducted a test of its first hydrogen 
bomb. Even though the exact number of Chinese warheads is not known, it is estimated that as of 
2013, China had about 250 warheads and since its first testing in 1964 it had manufactured about 
610 nuclear warheads (Kristensen & Norris 2013, p. 79). 
Other countries: Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea and South Africa also joined in the race for 
nuclear weapons. However, South Africa dismantled its nuclear weapons by 1991 when it joined 
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). India and Pakistan started 
production of their nuclear weapons around the same time, Kristensen & Norris (2013, p. 80) 
note that “the two countries are in an arms race to deploy new weapon types and are believed to 
be increasing their stockpiles.” It is believed that Israel started manufacturing its nuclear 
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weapons in the 1950s even though the official Israeli position on the topic has been neither to 
confirm nor deny these allegations. Israel is estimated to be in possession of about 80 nuclear 
warheads which is at par with India and Pakistan (Borger 2014). North Korea has an active 
nuclear weapons program and is in possession of an estimated 4-8 nuclear warheads and has 
tested a number of times in the last decade after its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003 (Kim 
2013). Below figure 2 (CTBTO Preparatory Commission, n.d) illustrates the sizes of nuclear 
tests as of 1996 that were conducted by the permanent members of the UN Security Council who 
all states with nuclear weapons. 
 
Figure 2: Nuclear Explosions 
 
 
2.4.2 Advancements in nuclear weapons technology 
One of the most serious implications to nuclear weapons disarmament is that of nuclear weapons 
modernising programs that are currently underway by states with nuclear weapons to improve 
the nuclear arsenals and related technologies that they have in their possession (Acheson 2012; 
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Kristensen & Norris 2013). From the 1940s to the 1960s there was rapid technological 
advancement followed by mainly additional improvements in most fields. Lodgaard (2011, p. 
47) notes: 
“During the first nuclear era, nuclear weapons were tailored to all sorts of delivery 
systems – to land-, air- and sea-based missiles of various ranges, to land- and carrier-
based aircraft, and to artillery systems. The Soviet Union had nuclear land-mines as well. 
Nuclear weapons substituted for conventional munitions to such an extent that by the 
1960s and 1970s, important US and Soviet force categories had little capacity for 
conventional warfare.”  
From the 1980s onwards efforts were placed on developments in missile accuracy and defence 
and also in computer simulation and non-explosive testing. “By the end of the Cold War in the 
early 1990s, the United States possessed 116 different nuclear delivery systems, including 11 
types of ballistic missile, 11 types of strategic bomber, and 3 types of ballistic missile 
submarines” (Jameson, 2013, p. 42). This clearly shows that the years from the 1940s to the 
1990s (more than half a century after the initial discovery of nuclear weapons) states with 
nuclear weapons were determined to increase the capabilities of their arsenals at all levels and 
cost. 
Billions have been spent by the states with nuclear weapons in efforts of advancing the “few” 
nuclear weapons that they possess. The delivery system of these modern warheads could mean 
that at a touch of a finger and within minutes, they can reach their target and cause catastrophic 
damage. According to William (2012, p. 335), “approximately 40 per cent of those 22,000 
warheads...are on some form of very rapid alert. It is estimated that the average length of time 
between a warning and a decision about whether to use a nuclear bomb is between four and eight 
minutes.” By spending billions in modernising their nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, 
these NWS are actually investing in the future of nuclear weapons rather than investing in 
disarmament (Acheson 2012, p. 88).  
2.5  Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons: 1969- Present 
The first efforts towards the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons happened immediately 
after the Second World War with the formation of the United Nations (UN). During the first  
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United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), a commission called the United Nations Atomic 
Energy Commission (AEC) was created to oversee among others the elimination of all WMD 
including the atomic bomb. The commission has been credited for some reduction in nuclear 
weapons possessed by NWS. However, the commission has not been able to achieve the goal of 
total elimination of all WMD (Adeniji 2002, p. 11). The best hope for nuclear weapons 
elimination lies with treaties that prevent the spread and the use of nuclear weapons as well as 
nuclear disarmament. Even though the exact number of nuclear weapons is not known, it is 
estimated that at present there are more than 10000 nuclear warheads that are being possessed by 
NWS reflecting a decrease in numbers from the 125 000 that were calculated to have been built 
since 1945 (Kristensen & Norris 2013, p. 75). This decrease can be attributed to the various 
treaties that have been established as a means of stopping the spread as well as the eventual total 
elimination of nuclear weapons. Below are some of the treaties that are in effect in the 
prevention of the spread and elimination of nuclear weapons. 
 
2.5.1 Limited Test Ban Treaty 
The very first major nuclear arms control agreement was the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) 
that was signed by US, UK and Soviet Union on August 5, 1963 and entered into force on 
October 10, 1963. Also referred to as the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) or the Nuclear Test 
Ban Treaty (NTBT), the Treaty basically bans all kinds of nuclear testing apart from those 
conducted underground. Article 1 of the Treaty prohibits signatory states from conducting 
military and/or peaceful nuclear test explosions in any place under its jurisdiction and control 
and further bans the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in outer space and under 
water. According to the CTBTO (n.d.), the Treaty was a result of domestic and international 
pressure the signatories faced due to the implications of nuclear weapons testing for the 
environment, health and overall global security. The main concern came to light when the US 
tested one of their nuclear weapons in the atmosphere. The result was that radioactive materials 
were released in the environment causing major health and environmental damage.  
Even though the Treaty managed to address important environmental issues as a result of nuclear 
weapons testing, it failed to address the issue of disarmament and/or proliferation. Therefore, the 
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world witnessed an increase in nuclear proliferation and testing (underground) years after the 
enforcement of the LTBT. It is also important to note that some countries that were not 
signatories to the Treaty such as France and China went on to conduct atmospheric nuclear 
weapons test as they were not bound by the Treaty thereby rendering the Treaty weak. 
 
2.5.2 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 
With time, many people including world leaders realised the dangers of the spread of nuclear 
weapons. The Irish government in 1959 at the 14th session of the UNGA was first to suggest the 
need for negotiations for a treaty to counter the increasing proliferation of nuclear weapons 
(Adeniji 2002, p. 13). As a result, during the 1960s, negotiations were initiated to try and limit 
the spread of these weapons. Through the UN, government representatives pushed for a non-
proliferation agreement that resulted in the NPT which was open for signature in 1968. The 
current UN secretary general Ban Ki Moon reaffirmed the NPT’s importance as he was quoted 
saying “the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is one of the most important multilateral accords in 
history. Though not perfect, it is the cornerstone of the world’s nuclear non-proliferation regime” 
(Swart 2013, p. 199). The Treaty has been ratified by all states with nuclear weapons except 
India, Pakistan, and Israel and it entered into force on the 5th of March 1970 (Magnarella 2008, p. 
509). From 193 Members of the UN, 188 States are the parties of the NPT (the five outside the 
Treaty are India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, and South Sudan). 
The Treaty comprises legally binding non-proliferation commitments and is the basis for 
international cooperation to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. The Treaty is reinforced by 
three “pillars”: (i) nuclear non-proliferation- where Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) will 
not seek to acquire nuclear weapons; (ii) disarmament- for NWS; and (iii) the peaceful use of 
nuclear energy for all states (Magnarella 2008, p. 509). 
The Treaty is also regarded as the legal and political foundation of the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime. The NPT has many important provisions such as article 1 that states that NWS that 
signed the treaty will not transfer nuclear weapons or any technology relating to nuclear weapons 
to NNWS; also they are prohibited from encouraging or assisting NNWS in manufacturing 
nuclear weapons. Article 2 directed at NNWS states that all parties to the treaty are prohibited 
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from acquiring, manufacturing and controlling nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive 
devices. Article 3 states that NNWS will follow safeguard measures monitored by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to ensure that they are meeting the obligations of 
the treaty and that the nuclear technology they might have is only being used for civilian 
purposes. Article 6 states “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in 
good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date 
and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict 
and effective international control.” Article 7 states “nothing in this Treaty affects the right of 
any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear 
weapons in their respective territories.” 
The basis of nuclear tension that is happening around the world rotates around those states with 
nuclear weapons that want to assert their nuclear weapons monopoly on one hand and on the 
other hand those states that are challenging this monopoly. There is now an increase in forces 
around the world that are challenging this “right” of a select few states to have nuclear 
domination and these forces are now refusing to be subjected to this reality. The Middle East in 
particular provides a good example of this nuclear monopoly and how it puts at risk the welfare 
of people in that region and world peace (Makhoul 2010, p. 83). 
 The NPT has a number of shortfalls. The first is that the treaty does not make provisions for 
prohibiting NWS from attacking NNWS (so called negative assurances) which is regarded as a 
security threat by these NNWS. Another shortcoming is that the Treaty failed to take into 
consideration states that can be involved in proliferation (who are not signatories to the Treaty) 
such as North Korea which withdrew from the treaty in 2003 and went on to test a nuclear device 
in 2006, such states also pose a threat to international peace and security yet the NPT did not 
make provisions for such cases (Magnarella 2008).  
The most notable shortfall has been the reluctance of NWS to engage in disarmament. As a 
matter of fact, some of these NWS such as US and Russia have even gone a step further to 
enhance their nuclear weapons (Magnarella 2008, p. 509-511). Also the NPT has been criticised 
as just being an agreement by NNWS to not acquire nuclear weapons which they abide by 
whereas the NWS has not lived to the end of their bargain in regards to disarmament. This has 
caused much concern by NNWS as they feel that their counterparts are not committed to the 
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Treaty (Keks 2011, p. 25-26). The withdrawal from the Treaty by North Korea was a signal of 
this dissatisfaction, thus weakening the Treaty. 
Another shortfall is that the IAEA’s verification ability remains in question as it lacks sufficient 
funding and manpower to fully investigate compliance of the non-proliferation agreement by 
NNWS. This weakness leads to lack of trust and confidence in the Treaty (Keks 2011, p. 26). 
As the NPT made no provisions to prohibit NWS from attacking NNWS using nuclear weapons, 
these states without nuclear weapons have taken it upon themselves to secure their states and 
regions from nuclear weapons attack through the creation of nuclear weapons free zones as is the 
obligation in article 7 of the NPT. 
 
2.5.3 Nuclear Weapons Free Zones 
The concept of Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) came before that of the NPT and was in 
the beginning established only in uninhabited areas (Antarctica and outer space). Thereafter, 
each NWFZ treaty that followed has progressively developed the concept to address various 
regional concerns as well as developing awareness of possible threats and the need to eliminate 
them (Tabassi 2009, p. 31). 
The creation of NWFZ by states, Tabassi (2009, p. 31) argues, is consistent with article 1 of the 
UN Charter that provides for states to take necessary collective measures to prevent and remove 
any threats to peace. Signatory states aim to achieve this by removing nuclear weapons in their 
zones and preventing others from using these weapons on them thereby securing international 
peace and security in the long run. 
A NWFZ according to Magnarella (2008, p. 511) “is a populated region whose member states 
have formally agreed by a multilateral treaty to prohibit the acquisition, stockpiling, deployment, 
and testing of nuclear weapons within their territories, airspace, and waters.” A large number of 
states that did not possess nuclear weapons joined forces and created NWFZs as a response to the 
shortcomings of the NPT or can also be viewed as a complement to the NPT by some. In doing 
that, “they emphatically rejected nuclear weapons on their soil, in their territorial waters, and in 
their air space. In addition, they ask nuclear weapon states to solemnly promise not to use 
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nuclear weapons against zone members and to do nothing to promote nuclear weapons in their 
zones”, Magnarella (2008) notes. 
The formation of NWFZs has contributed to the enhancement in security of member states of 
such zones, to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and can also contribute to 
the objectives of overall and complete disarmament (Magnarella 2008; Tabassi 2009). This has 
also resulted in confidence building among states in NWFZs due to the joint promises made by 
these states not to develop or allow any form of nuclear weapons on their territories.  Each treaty 
contains one or more protocols that must be ratified by NWS where they agree “not to use or 
threaten to use nuclear weapons against NWFZ members, not to test or assist in the testing of 
nuclear weapons within an NWFZ, and not to contribute to any act that would constitute a 
violation of the NWFZ treaty” (Magnarella 2008, p. 511-12) 
The first NWFZs to ever be establish were the Antarctic (1959) and the Outer Spaces Zones. 
These two NWFZs are in uninhabited areas as a result nuclear weapons tests were conducted in 
these areas. However, this still posed as threats to the environment even though the areas were 
desolate but the main aim for creating these two NWFZs was to prevent the militarisation of 
these designated areas (Tabassi 2009, p. 31).  
At present, there are five NWFZ in inhabited areas. The first one was the Latin America and 
Caribbean NWFZ called the Treaty of Tlatelolco which was opened for signature in February of 
1967, which was 18 months before the NPT (Adeniji 2002, p. ix; Magnarella 2008, p. 518).  The 
Treaty entered into force in 1969. This was followed by the South Pacific NWFZ referred to as 
the Treaty of Rarotonga that entered into force in 1989. The Southeast Asia NWFZ came next 
and it entered into force in 1997 and it was called the Treaty of Bangkok. Then came the African 
NWFZ which was referred to as the Pelindaba Treaty and it opened for signature in 1996 and 
came into force in 2009.  Finally, the Central Asian NWFZ was opened for signature in 2006 
(Magnarella 2008, p. 513-518).  
Magnerella (2008, p. 518) further notes that: “It is ironic that the Northern Hemisphere, which 
contains those permanent members of the UNSC, whose responsibility it is to ensure 
international peace, contains all of today’s nuclear weapons. The large arsenals of these Security 
Council permanent members endanger our planet the most.” At present, all the NWFZs are 
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allocated in the southern hemisphere and the hope is that the Northern Hemisphere can learn and 
follow the example provided by their southern partners by making their region a NWFZ and 
thereby achieving the goal of a nuclear weapons free world (Magnarella 2008, p. 519). 
NWFZs also serve as deterrence from external pressure brought by NWS who might want to 
station nuclear weapons or parts of its support systems in parts of that region. Also the 
establishment of a NWFZ maybe the utmost important and effective political and legal 
instrument a state can use to contribute towards nuclear disarmament (Tabassi 2009, p. 33). 
Another advantage of NWFZs is that they serve as a first step towards integrating those states 
that are not party to the NPT into the Treaty as has been demonstrated by the Treaties of 
Tlatelolco and Pelindaba (Tabassi 2009, p. 57) 
 
2.5.4 Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) 
The CTBT goes beyond the LTBT as it completely bans all forms of nuclear testing (military and 
civilian) on earth be it surface, atmospheric, underground or underwater. Although the primary 
goal of the Treaty was to ban nuclear weapons testing, there were also great expectations that it 
could also contribute towards nuclear weapon disarmament and non-proliferation. One of its 
main aims was to block the development of nuclear weapons as the treaty makes it nearly 
impossible for NNWS to develop nuclear weapons as well as making it almost impossible for 
NWS to develop or advance their existing nuclear weapons without testing. Swart (2013, p. 198) 
argues that “the CTBT makes an important contribution in that it makes it difficult for countries 
to develop nuclear weapons for the first time or, for countries that already have them, to make 
more powerful bombs”. The US and other nuclear weapons states whose ratifications are 
required in order for the Treaty to come to effect are yet to do so. 
The Treaty was regarded as a breakthrough in terms of arms control. It was the first time the 
major powers made some progress in test banning at a period where they were fighting for 
military and geopolitical dominance. To date, the Treaty has 183 signatories and all but three 
African states (South Sudan, Somalia and Mauritius) have signed the Treaty, but nine African 
states have not ratified the treaty with Angola being the most recent state to have ratified the 
treaty on March 20, 2015 (CTBTO n.d). See Figure 3 below (CTBTO Preparatory Commission, 
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n.d) makes a clear illustration of world map with states that are signatories, those not signed and 
those that have ratified the Treaty, (note that Angola now falls in the green bracket). 
However, as this treaty seems core to the limitation of nuclear weapons, it still remains 
effectively powerless as it is still to enter into force. The treaty requires 44 specific states to 
ratify it to come into force and as of 2010 China, North Korea, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, 
Israel, Pakistan and the USA had not yet signed and/or ratified the Treaty. North Korea, India 
and Pakistan have yet to sign the CTBT and they actually went on to conduct nuclear tests after 
the treaty was negotiated in 1996 with India and Pakistan testing in 1998 and North Korea in 
2006, 2009 and in 2013 (Swart 2013;  United Nations n.d).  
 
Figure 3: CTBT Signatures and Ratifications 
 
 
2.6  Nuclear disorder 
In the last decade, there has been growing concern over the possible spread of nuclear weapons 
with North Korea having nuclear weapons and Iran with its uranium enrichment program and 
more states seeking to acquire nuclear power plants for civilian purposes. Nuclear armed states 
that are not bound by NPT rules and norms such as India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea are 
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most likely to cause nuclear disorder as exemplified by North Korea. The growing need for 
alternative means to the production of electricity has led to states pursuing nuclear energy, which 
uses enriched uranium and plutonium. The latter is also used for the manufacturing of nuclear 
weapons. Therefore, the line between the fuel for nuclear power reactors for peaceful purposes or 
military purposes can be misleading due to the dual-use nature of the materials (Sagan 2011; 
Perkovich 2008). All these cases have been identified as possible avenues that could lead to 
future nuclear disorder. The problem of non-compliance with treaties and laws that have been 
put in place to limit and eliminate the threat posed by nuclear weapons is definitely a threat to 
international peace and security as it renders all disarmament measures as effortless. 
Creation of the Israeli and Indian exceptions is also another concern that could bring disorder in 
the international community. The West and some of their allies have allowed or turned a blind 
eye to Israel and India acquiring nuclear weapons while they reprimand and sanction other states 
that have made similar efforts such as Iran and North Korea. This has contributed to resentments 
because of the obvious double standards (Walker 2014a). All disarmament and non-proliferation 
measures need to be applied equally to all parties without exceptions as this can create tension 
which could result in future nuclear disorder. 
Another of the threats to nuclear order is the failure of the nine NWS to take necessary action 
towards the destruction of all their nuclear weapons (Perkovich 2008, p. 10). The failure by 
NWS to eliminate their nuclear arsenal is cause for concern which could be reason enough for 
some NNWS to argue for possible acquisition as a result. For as long as nuclear weapons are in 
existence and in possession by some states, other states will also seek to acquire them for the 
same reasons or benefits that they offer. Therefore there is growing need for those NWS to 
comply with nuclear disarmament measures that are in place to oversee the eventual complete 
elimination of nuclear weapons. 
Ways of future nuclear proliferation also poses a threat to nuclear order as there is a chance that 
some state or non-state actors will in the future be able to get their hands on nuclear weapons or 
illegally be able to manufacture nuclear weapons. It is a serious cause for concern especially if 
those weapons were to be in the hands of terrorist groups. Secret violations of the IAEA 
safeguards by some states (North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Libya, and Syria), withdrawal from the NPT 
and acquisition of nuclear weapons as demonstrated by North Korea also pose as threats to 
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nuclear order (Walker 2014a). It is argued that complete elimination of nuclear weapons will 
reduce these challenges and risks to nuclear disorder. 
 
 
2.7 Summary  
Even though the NPT provides a sound framework for nuclear non-proliferation and 
disarmament, and even though the number of nuclear weapons has decreased, a number of states 
have embarked on advancing the nuclear weapons in their possession thereby making those 
nuclear arsenals more lethal than they initially were in their inception. Moreover, due to the 
indiscriminate nature of these weapons whether small all large, it means that the existence of 
nuclear weapons pose a threat to humanity. Also, there is a risk that states which have embarked 
on the acquisition of nuclear programs for peaceful purposes could pursue military goals because 
the technology is dual-use. With that in mind, it remains an urgent matter for the international 
community to address the problem of nuclear weapons that poses a threat to international, 
regional and national security. Africa’s role in this matter will be discussed in the following 
chapter. 
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Chapter Three: Africa and nuclear weapons 
 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter aims to further describe the context in which the research question (Africa’s 
contribution through the Pelindaba Treaty to nuclear disarmament using the humanitarian 
approach) has significance. Not only was the continent used as a testing ground for nuclear 
weapons, it also offers the best example of the possibility of nuclear weapons disarmament. 
Moreover, the continent has the only state to have ever manufactured and voluntarily destroyed 
its nuclear weapons. This chapter is, therefore, dedicated to the discussion of efforts that have 
been undertaken by African states collectively and individually to contribute to nuclear weapons 
disarmament. To begin, the chapter will look at the history of Africa in terms of its first 
involvement with nuclear weapons discourse mainly that of a “testing ground”. Then, the chapter 
will look at the nuclear weapons ambitions of some states that had nuclear programs for military 
purposes and those seeking the program for peaceful purposes. This will be followed by a 
discussion of uranium mining in Africa which is one of the main reasons that Africa is drawn 
into nuclear discourse as the continent has abundant deposits of uranium, a key component in the 
manufacturing of nuclear weapons. Thereafter, the chapter will look at the position of Africa in 
relation to nuclear weapons as well as the Pelindaba Treaty that made the continent a nuclear 
weapons free zone. Finally, the chapter will look at Africa’s participation at multilateral 
groupings on the issues of nuclear weapons.  
 
3.2 Nuclear weapons testing in Africa 
At the time of the start of the NPT negotiations, African states had already became aware of the 
problems related to nuclear weapons mainly as a result of the French nuclear testing in the 
Sahara Desert (Adeniji 2002, p. 14). The BBC on December 27, 1960 reported that in February 
1960 France carried out its first nuclear weapons test in the Saharan desert of Algeria at a place 
called Reganne Oasis, followed by two more tests, one in April and another in December. All 
these were surface and atmospheric tests. The CTBTO (n.d) notes that: “France switched to 
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underground testing at another site in the Algerian Sahara, named In Ecker, where it conducted a 
further 13 nuclear tests until 1967.” The French tests in the Sahara was met with much protest 
and outrage from the international community as this was seen as a serious challenge to 
disarmament efforts that were underway at that time. The third test which was carried out in 
December of 1960, a day before the African summit in Morocco, was met with much outrage by 
African states who viewed the tests as “nuclear imperialism” (BBC 1960). 
A number of newly independent African states in the 1960s insisted on keeping the region a 
nuclear weapons free zone to the extent that some took drastic measures against the nuclear 
activities of some great powers such as France when it conducted its nuclear tests in the Sahara 
desert. The then deputy secretary general of the Arab League, El Dardiri Ismail, called for all 
Arab states in the League to cut off political and economic ties with France whereas Sudan 
recalled its ambassador from France (BBC 1960). The Nigerian government severed its 
diplomatic ties with France in 1961 and closed Nigeria's ports and airports to French ships and 
planes, while Ghana under Kwame Nkrumah froze the assets of France in its country altogether 
(BBC 1960; Ogunbadejo1984).  
Following the suggestion by the Irish delegation in 1959, for the need of a treaty to prevent 
further nuclear proliferation, a committee was set up by the UNGA comprising of 18 countries 
mandated with the special priority of considering a treaty to prevent nuclear proliferation. The 
committee called the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) comprised of NWS, 
non-aligned and neutral states. This committee would eventually be responsible for the 
negotiations and drafting of what we now call the NPT. Three African states also formed part of 
the committee: Egypt, Ethiopia and Nigeria, and these three were vocal in the negotiations of the 
treaty. Egypt brought into light the efforts by African states to rid the continent of nuclear 
weapons whereas Ethiopia expressed the need for the treaty to encompass a comprehensive test 
ban and denuclearisation of certain areas while Nigeria highlighted a number of principles that 
the treaty should be based on (Adeniji 2002, p. 14). 
When the NPT came into effect in 1970, it served as a big relief for most African governments. 
The NPT proved to benefit these states as not only did it prevent the super powers from 
conducting nuclear tests in the region which had dangers of radio-active contaminations, but it 
also served as a barricade to other states in the region who had nuclear weapons ambitions thus it 
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acted as a security instrument for most of these African states (Ogunbadejo 1984, p. 21). 
However, the BBC (1960) argues that “no amount of protest - be it from small African states to 
major superpowers like the USSR - prevented the French from carrying out even more tests in 
the Sahara in the race to catch up with America and Britain in nuclear arms technology.” 
Despite the outrage by some African states, within the continent efforts were also under way by 
some African countries to mine uranium (an important component in the manufacturing of 
nuclear weapons) as well as the actual acquisition of nuclear weapons by some African states 
such as South Africa and Libya. 
 
3.3 African states with nuclear weapons programmes 
South Africa (SA) is the only African state to have successfully manufactured nuclear weapons. 
Until it dismantled them in 1989 it had managed to produce an estimate of seven nuclear 
warheads (Albright 1994). Albright further argues that SA’s nuclear weapons were not 
necessarily for military purposes but rather as a political tool engineered to bring the West to the 
aid of SA in the event of a possible attack by the Soviets. Among some of the reasons for SA’s 
nuclear weapons was the hostile neighbours-war relationship it had with Angola in 1987; those 
nuclear weapons were to provide SA bargaining power in relation to Soviet and Cuban 
involvement in Angola. Another reason was that the state was internationally isolated as a result 
of the apartheid rule so no nuclear weapon state would come to SA’s help should they be 
attacked (John 2007). De Villiers et al (1993) also confirms that due to its deteriorating relations 
with the international community, SA felt isolated, therefore, the state felt the need to secure 
itself or to be  able to defend itself if ever there was a possible attack on the country. 
SA can attribute its success in being the only African state to have fully manufactured nuclear 
weapons to the abundance of uranium reserves the country has. Starting off as suppliers of 
uranium to countries that had nuclear weapons programmes such as the US and Britain, SA later 
decided to launch a nuclear research program for peaceful applications in the late 1950s (De 
Villiers et al 1993). Horton (1999, p. 04) notes “South Africa’s quest for a nuclear deterrent 
capability required the acquisition of at least four basic elements: raw materials (uranium or 
plutonium), the ability to enrich the materials to weapons grade, trained personnel and adequate 
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facilities, and the capability to acquire or manufacture components required for the nuclear 
device.” By the late 1960s, the government constructed a uranium enrichment plant for 
commercial purposes. However, the facility also meant the possibility of developing a nuclear 
weapon. In 1978, SA changed its nuclear research program to focus on military rather than 
peaceful applications. The first fully assembled nuclear weapon was produced in 1979 and later 
on an additional six nuclear weapons were manufactured (De Villiers et al 1993). 
F.W. de Klerk, after taking over as President, issued an order in 1989 for the termination of the 
nuclear weapons program that was underway and destruction of existing nuclear weapons as the 
state was moving towards becoming a member of the NPT (which they joined on the 10 July, 
1991).SA followed the same policy as Israel, one of nuclear ambiguity. It was only in 1993, four 
years after calling for their destruction, that SA’s former president de Klerk admitted that the 
country had nuclear weapons (Albright 1994).  
Schmitt and Kawashima writing on behalf of the Arms Control Association (2014) noted that 
Libya had a nuclear weapons program but at the time of its dismantlement it is not clear if it had 
succeeded in the actual manufacturing of a nuclear warhead. Nigeria is also suspected to have 
had nuclear weapons intentions, however details of these claims are unknown 
(GlobalSecurity.org). 
 
3.4 African states with nuclear plants for peaceful purposes 
Most of the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Africa is associated with the generation of 
electricity. According to Adeniji (2002, p. 05) “the study of energy needs in Africa shows that 
demand growth is projected to be well above the global forecast.” This means that the continent 
is facing increasing demand for electricity and states on the continent are struggling to meet this 
ever increasing demand.  The challenge of electricity shortage has had impacts on the social 
economic development as well as the enhancement on the quality of life of many people on the 
continent. The shortage of electricity which is a common problem in most African countries has 
led to the need to explore other alternative sources of electricity from the conventional sources 
such as coal, oil, gas and hydro. Nuclear energy is now seen as the answer/new source to tackle 
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the increasing demand for electricity, a challenge experienced by many African states (Adeniji 
2002, p. 05). 
According to the 2014 report by the World Nuclear Association, there are more than 45 states 
around the world that are actively considering embarking upon nuclear power programs. These 
states range from those that have advanced economies to developing nations. All North African 
countries (Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Algeria, Morocco and Sudan) have embarked on nuclear 
research programs. Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, Kenya, Uganda and Namibia are among the sub-
Sahara countries who are actively considering the initiative. 
There are a number of African states that have expressed interest in developing nuclear energy to 
combat the challenge of electricity shortages and there are already eight research reactors across 
the continent (Broodryk & Stott 2012, p. 29). A report by IAEA reveals that at present Algeria, 
Egypt, Ghana, Libya, Morocco, Nigeria and SA have functioning nuclear research reactors 
(Laursen 2012, p. 12). The IAEA September 2010 report on international status and prospects of 
nuclear power revealed that there were about 65 states that did not have nuclear power who were 
either showing an interest in, considering, or actively planning for nuclear power and of those, 21 
were African states. 
The World Nuclear News (2013) notes that the Koeberg nuclear power plant in SA is the only 
operating power plant in Africa. 5% of SA’s electricity is generated from the nuclear reactor it 
has at Koeberg. SA’s first commercial nuclear power reactors began operating in 1984. The 
country is part of the Southern Africa Power Pool (SAPP) and is responsible for 80% of the 
generating capacity of SAPP which is fuelled by coal (World Nuclear Association 2014 a). 
Nigeria currently generates its electricity from plants, gas, hydro and oil and it still fails to meet 
the demands of its populous country. The government is currently planning on increasing its 
solar power systems as well as develop plans (with the aid of the IEAE) for nuclear power plants 
to meet power shortages which have greatly affected the country to the extent that it has caused 
industries to relocate to neighbouring countries like Ghana. The Nigerian government signed an 
agreement with Russia in 2009 which included the provision for the exploration and mining of 
uranium in the country as well as the construction of Russian power and research reactors. Other 
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major powers such as China and the US are also working with the Nigerian government in 
nuclear power plants and research plant programs (World Nuclear Association 2014c). 
Ghana relies mostly on its own locally produced electricity generated mostly from hydro power 
plants. It aims to be an electricity exporter with the aid of nuclear power plants it intends to 
install. Ghana signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with Russia in mid-2012 which aims to 
build infrastructure for nuclear power in the country. Senegal and Uganda were also considering 
nuclear power plants as alternatives to power generation to meet the domestic demands for 
electricity in their respective countries (World Nuclear Association 2014 c). 
Kenya’s electricity production comes from hydro, oil and geothermal. With the recommendation 
by the country’s National Economic and Social Council, the government aims to start using 
nuclear power by the year 2020 to meet its growing electricity demand. Namibia like the other 
states also faces electricity supply constraints despite the state being one of the world’s major 
suppliers of uranium. As the state faces severe challenges in power supply, it relies mostly on 
electricity supplied by its neighbour SA which also experiences supply constraints (World 
Nuclear Association 2014 c). 
 
3.5 Uranium exploration and mining in Africa 
Africa has an abundance of mineral deposits of which uranium ore is one of them. Uranium, a 
key component in the production of nuclear weapons is also used as a fuel for the generation of 
electricity as well as used in other projects for peaceful purposes. Many African countries have 
uranium ore deposits, and four African countries were in the top 20 of the global uranium 
exporters of 2012: Niger (4), Namibia (5), Malawi (10) and SA (12). African countries also make 
up a total of 18% of the world’s uranium production with 8% coming from Namibia, 7% from 
Niger, 1.2% from Malawi and 1% from SA and the rest from other African states (Dasnois 2012, 
p. 05). Other African countries that are exploring/mining uranium are Algeria, Botswana, Central 
African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Gabon, Guinea, Equatorial 
Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe (Swart, 2013, p. 212). 
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The DRC, previously known as the Belgian Congo, was one of the major suppliers of uranium 
for the Manhattan project in the early 1940s (Dasnois 2012; Swart, 2013). Because of political 
instability in the country, there isn’t much uranium mining activity; only the unofficial mining of 
the deposits for Cobalt which started in1997. Despite no current mining in Gabon, there is active 
uranium exploration that continues in the country. Much of the uranium mining in Gabon was 
linked to Niger (World Nuclear Association, 2014 b).  
Uranium was discovered in Niger by a French company looking for copper in 1957 but it was 
only in 1971 that the first commercial uranium mine began operating and since then Niger  has 
gone on to produce some of Africa’s highest grade uranium ores  from its two important uranium 
mines providing 7.5% of world mining output. There is also robust government support for the 
expansion of uranium mining (Dasnois 2012; World Nuclear Association 2014 b). 
In Namibia, uranium was first discovered in 1928 in the Namib desert but it was only in the late 
1950s that intense exploration got underway and only in 1976 was the country’s first commercial 
mine began operating. In Namibia there are two significant uranium mines which are capable of 
producing about 10% of the overall world mining output. Like Niger, there is strong government 
support for the expansion of uranium mining as well as an interest in using the uranium for 
domestic nuclear power purposes (World Nuclear Association, 2014b). 
In Malawi, uranium was discovered in the 1980s but extraction only started in 2009. Despite this 
late discovery, Malawi has gone to be the third largest supplier of uranium in Africa. The country 
only has one uranium mine in the far northern part of the country and Paladin Energy, a Western 
Australian company is the only mining company that is operating the Kayelekera mine in the 
country/s northern district of Karonga, the same company that also mines uranium at the Langer 
Heinrich mine in Namibia (Dasnois 2012, p. 07). 
Uranium mining in SA was generally a by-product of gold/copper mining. SA is the fourth 
highest producer of uranium in Africa and the twelfth in the world. Uranium reserve that SA has 
is believed to be the second largest reserve in the world (Dasnois 2012, p. 07). 
Even though Africa mines and uses uranium for peaceful purposes, it has been argued by some 
that due to factors facing the continent such as corruption and weak central authority, Africa 
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remains an ideal destination for potential nuclear weapon seekers such as Iran; thereby still 
contributing to the threat of nuclear weapons as they seem to sponsor materials (uranium) to the 
potential seekers of nuclear weapons (Swart 2013, p. 212). 
3.6 Africa’s position on nuclear weapons 
The topic of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons still remains an issue of 
low priority among African governments despite the successful initiative of the elimination of 
nuclear weapons in the African region. The reason for this is the existence of other national 
security and human security issues like intra-state conflicts, small arms proliferation, poverty, 
and HIV/Aids. Two African states stand out though in terms of the work they put into the cause 
of nuclear weapons elimination both at individual and multilateral level: SA and Egypt. Egypt 
has played a leading role in the discussions for a Middle East weapon of mass destruction free 
zone. This has been the case not only because of its (and other states north of the Sahara) close 
relations with Middle Eastern states, but also due to the close proximity it shares with the region. 
SA on the other hand being the only state in Africa to have voluntarily dismantled its nuclear 
weapons has been at the fore in pushing the disarmament agenda based on its own experience as 
well as for the sake of international peace and security (Laursen 2012, p. 16). 
Speaking at the UNGA in 1998, former SA President and human rights advocate Nelson 
Mandela argued for joint efforts by states (especially the coalition of eight UN nations of which 
SA was amongst) against nuclear weapons. He did so to encourage the elimination of nuclear 
weapons and the threat of total destruction of mankind they pose. While addressing the 53rd 
UNGA Mandela was quoted saying “We must face the fact that after countless initiatives and 
resolutions, we still do not have concrete and generally accepted proposals supported by a clear 
commitment by the nuclear-weapons states to the speedy, final and total elimination of nuclear 
weapons and nuclear weapons capabilities”. This statement echoed the voice of the frustrated 
international community on how they could no longer remain complacent with the reluctance of 
disarmament by nuclear weapons states despite numerous disarmament efforts.    
In addition, while representing Africa in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as a non-
permanent member in 2010, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni commented on Africa’s 
position on nuclear weapons and called for a nuclear weapons free world. He encouraged states 
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to have access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes only. He is quoted by Ntale (2010) as 
saying: “Nuclear weapons are dangerous for humanity-even more dangerous than all the other 
previous weapon systems…We should, therefore, work for a nuclear weapons-free world. This 
means that those who have these weapons should work to get rid of them under an 
internationally agreed and verifiable treaty.” It is clear that most if not all African states share the 
same sentiments as was evidence with the signing and ratification of the Pelindaba Treaty, which 
will be discussed below. 
According to Swart (2013, p. 210): “African governments were reported to have played a more 
active role in the 2010 NPT Review conference… In addition, some African States have 
requested membership at the Conference on Disarmament, but these requests have been denied.” 
This shows that there are African states that, given the chance, would champion the call for 
disarmament. However, the numbers of those willing states are few, which have led to some 
accusing African states of a lack of interest in relation to their participation in nuclear weapons 
debates and discourse. 
In terms of UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004), African states have proved how low priority the issue 
of nuclear weapons is on their agenda in a region where there are more immediate and possibly 
more relevant problems, such as combating poverty and the spread of HIV/Aids. As is the 
requirement of the resolution for all member states to submit a report to the committee on the 
measures they have taken or plan to implement to meet the provisions of the resolution, we see 
that the attitude of these African states towards the issue of proliferation of WMD comes to light 
as only 34 of the 54 African states have submitted their reports and most of which are 
incomplete. Those states that have submitted their reports have indicated their inability in 
assisting non state actors in acquiring nuclear weapons as they themselves are not in possession 
of any type of WMD (Dye 2008, United Nations official document, 2011)). 
 
Swart (2013) identifies a number of factors attributing to this lack of involvement or engagement 
of African states in matters relating to nuclear weapons; 
a. Less involvement of African states in the production and use of nuclear weapons as a 
result of the Pelindaba Treaty. With the treaty in effect, African states are well aware of 
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their obligations not to participate in any activity that might lead to the development of 
nuclear weapons so with that in mind and after securing their continent of nuclear 
weapons or any direct threat of their use on the continent, states have now taken a passive 
role in the matter. 
b. Geographic location of Sub Sahara Africa makes the continent far removed from NWS 
plus less of a target. All of the southern part of the world is now a NWFZ therefore 
nuclear weapons are found in areas far from the southern region of which Africa is part of 
so these states do not have much to worry about unlike if the NWS were in neighbouring 
regions and also due to the continent’s friendly ties with NWS it makes it less of a target 
therefore the inactive role Africa plays as they are not directly under threat. 
c. Perception that nuclear weapons are an issue of “first world countries” and that “African 
states are only dragged unwillingly into the debate by western countries”. To be in 
possession of nuclear weapons and their maintenance requires great financial 
resources,which most African states do not have as they are among some of the poorest 
states in the world. Therefore they view nuclear weapons as a thing for those rich first 
world countries and they only get involved as part of the international community. 
d. African states tend to vote in line with donor states and most of these donor states happen 
to be NWS. Therefore, as noted earlier that these NWS seem to be reluctant in addressing 
the call for disarmament and complete elimination, we see most African states also 
following suit in making the issue of less urgency. 
e. The continent is currently dealing with issues such as small arms and light weaponry 
which in a sense are seen by Africa states as the real “weapons of mass destruction”. 
Guns have killed millions of innocent victims in Africa as a result of a number of 
conflicts that have taken place (still are) in the continent. Because the light weapons 
(guns) have wiped out millions of people around the continent and not nuclear weapons, 
African states view them as WMD due to their destructiveness witnessed and not nuclear 
weapons per se.  
f. Competing priorities of security issues such as poverty, unemployment, diseases etcetera. 
Again there are more pressing real time threats to human, national and regional security 
that African governments have to deal with therefore less time is spent by these 
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governments discussing matters of potential threat to human security when they are 
currently dealing with humanitarian threats on a daily basis. 
 
 
3.7 The Pelindaba Treaty 
It was at the 1964 Organisation of African Unity (OAU) first summit that member states 
articulated their willingness to commit the continent as a NWFZ through a treaty; however it was 
not until thirty years later that these member states started on the actual negotiations of the treaty 
(Adeniji 2002; Pretorius 2011). After the negotiations and agreements, the Treaty was opened for 
signature in Cairo, Egypt on April 11, 1996 and came into force in 2009 after it was ratified by 
the 28th instrument as is the provision made in article 18 (2). In sum, the Treaty bans any form of 
nuclear activity on the continent unless it is for peaceful purposes. Research, development, 
manufacturing, stockpiling, acquisition, possession, testing and controlling of any form of 
nuclear weapon device are prohibited. 
The Treaty at its conception had a lot of support from the international community and the UN. 
Speaking at the 1996 signing ceremony of the Pelindaba Treaty in Cairo, the then secretary 
general of the UN, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, cited in Adeniji (2002, p. 320) said: “Let us not forget 
that the most safe, sure and swift way to deal with the threat of nuclear arms is to do away with 
them in every regard by having a nuclear weapon-free world. This should be our vision of the 
future. No more production. No more testing. No more sales or transfers. Reduction, destruction 
and the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons and the means of their manufacture should 
be humanity’s great common cause”. This statement is re-enforced in article 3(a) of the Treaty 
where member states pledge “not to conduct research on, develop, manufacture, stockpile or 
otherwise acquire, possess or have control over any nuclear explosive device by any means 
anywhere”. 
 
Furthermore, article 3 of the Treaty pertaining to the “Renunciation of nuclear explosive 
devices” put more emphasis as it states that each party undertakes: 
 
 
 
 
43 
 
(b) Not to seek or receive any assistance in the research on, development, manufacture, 
stockpiling or acquisition, or possession of any nuclear explosive device; 
(c) Not to take any action to assist or encourage the research on, development, manufacture, 
stockpiling or acquisition, or possession of any nuclear explosive device. 
 
Africa’s readiness to undertake all means necessary “in achieving the ultimate goal of a world 
entirely free of nuclear weapons, as well as of the obligations of all States to contribute to this 
end” (Adeniji 2002. P. 321) was demonstrated through the introduction and signing of the Treaty 
that eliminated nuclear weapons in the region. It was also evident in prohibiting member states in 
engaging in nuclear weapon activities directly and indirectly unless it was for the purposes of 
contributing towards disarmament or nuclear energy for peaceful use. In addition, the signing of 
the treaty was a possible suggestion of the increasing drive as well as the political willingness by 
those African member states to achieve actual progress towards nuclear weapon disarmament 
(Tabassi, 2009, p. 57). 
Additionally, the importance of the Pelindaba Treaty was highlighted by Boutros Boutros-Ghali 
cited in Adeniji (2002, p. 319) who notes “the establishment of an African nuclear-weapon-free 
zone will advance global disarmament norms and contribute to efforts to prevent the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons and strengthen the international non-proliferation regime. It will 
accelerate the stride towards a world free from nuclear weapons. It is a promising example to 
others wishing to contribute to broadening the areas of the world from which nuclear weapons 
will be forever proscribed.” 
 
Fifty-three African states, excluding South Sudan (yet to become a member), signed the treaty 
and at present 16 states are yet to ratify. Some states have failed to ratify due to reasons of weak 
government structures or internal instability within their borders as is the case with Somalia. 
Other states like Egypt have not ratified due to political reasons (on condition that Israel comply 
to the NPT as a NNWS) while other states hesitate based on economic reasons whereby the 
ratification of the treaty would impact on their uranium exports- a breach to article 9 (c) of the 
Treaty (Pretorius 2011, p. 326). Table 1. (Disarmament treaties database: Pelindaba treaty, 2009) 
shows those African states that signed the Treaty but are yet to ratify it for various reasons. 
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Table 1: African states that have signed but not ratified the Pelindaba Treaty 
State Signed 
 Angola April 11, 1996 
 Cape Verde April 11, 1996 
 CAR April 11, 1996 
 DRC April 11, 1996 
 Djibouti April 11, 1996 
 Egypt April 11, 1996 
 Eritrea April 11, 1996 
 Liberia July 09, 1996 
 Morocco April 11, 1996 
 Niger April 11, 1996 
 São Tomé and Príncipe July 09, 1996 
 Seychelles July 09, 1996 
 Sierra Leone April 11, 1996 
 Somalia February 23, 2006 
 Sudan April 11, 1996 
 Uganda April 11, 1996 
 
One of the most critical drawbacks of the Pelindaba Treaty, like all the zone treaties, is the 
Additional Protocol requirements, and the belief that if only the nuclear-armed states promise not 
to use nuclear weapons against the region, then Africa will be safe. Nothing can protect third-
party states from the impact of nuclear weapons. Negative security assurances only consolidate 
further the divide between the nuclear-armed and the non-nuclear weapon states according to the 
Project Leader in WMD Project for ILPI: Mr Hugo (Interviewed 19/11/2014). In effect, it helps 
legitimize nuclear weapons as in a way it acknowledges that it is alright to have nuclear weapons 
as long as they will not be used on the continent.  
Adeniji notes (2002, p. 02): “Non-proliferation was the primary reason for the African Heads of 
States’ Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa in 1964”, this means that the driving 
objective for the Treaty was disarmament for security (military) reasons and not necessarily 
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humanitarian reasons. However, this does not imply that the motivation behind the drafting of 
the Treaty was not influenced by other factors such as the humanitarian concerns relating to the 
consequences of nuclear weapons use. 
In addition, Mr Torbjorn Graff  Hugo (interviewed 19/11/2014) highlights that the Pelindaba 
Treaty took a very long time to negotiate, and an equally long time to enter into force and to date 
there are still a two digit number of states that have not ratified. Hence, the impact of the Treaty 
on disarmament and the humanitarian initiative maybe in question. What has changed is that 
Africa as a group now can proclaim that they have already prohibited nuclear weapons 
regionally, and it is time to do the same globally. Also, it should be recognised that NWFZ 
cannot protect African states from the global effects of the use of nuclear weapons; this should 
be used as an argument to engage African states more actively as they are not safe/free from 
experiencing the consequences of nuclear weapons if ever used. 
3.8 African engagements at multilateral groupings 
According to Swart (2013, p. 215) “civil society has opined that nuclear weapons-possessing 
States would be deeply unsettled if there were to be a common African position on the 
prohibition of nuclear weapons. Many countries are calling for African States to contribute to the 
debate, both quantitatively, as a bloc of 54 States, and qualitatively, through norm-setting.” Over 
the years, some African states have taken heed of this call and have participated in forums that 
address the issues of nuclear weapons. When it comes to international forums that address 
nuclear weapons below are some of the forums that African states are involvement in: Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, The UN General Assembly First Committee on 
Disarmament and International Security, The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, The Conference 
on Disarmament, African perspectives on UNSC Resolution 1540 and the Nuclear Security 
Summit. 
According to Laursen (2012, p. 08): “The Conference on Disarmament (CD) is a multilateral 
negotiating forum for disarmament and arms control…The CD now counts 65 members, 
including all the nine nuclear-armed states. Only 12 African states are currently members of the 
CD: Algeria, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Morocco, 
Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tunisia, and Zimbabwe.” Even though there is some contribution 
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by African states in the CD, there is still a need for more African states to contribute to the 
conference if the world is to witness nuclear elimination. As there is strength in numbers, and 
Africa comprises of 54 states, it would strengthen the cause if not only all African states 
participated in the CD, but all other states in the world as this should be the responsibility of 
everyone to oversee nuclear disarmament.   
Also, African states engage in issues of nuclear weapons in multilateral groupings such as the 
African Union (AU), Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the New Agenda Coalition (NAC). 
The AU played a very important role in the whole process of making the continent a NWFZ. The 
organisation had a key role in the negotiating process and ratification of the Pelindaba Treaty. 
Despite having such a significant role in the elimination of nuclear weapons in the region, the 
AU is yet to put a mark on the global initiative of nuclear weapons elimination. This is the case 
as in terms of security, the AU has other more pressing issues on its agenda. Therefore much of 
its efforts are focused on these immediate challenges facing Africa’s security than on issues of 
global nuclear weapons disarmament (Laursen 2012, p. 12). 
NAM is a grouping of states that are not directly/formally aligned with or against any major 
block. All African states apart from the recently independent South Sudan are members of NAM. 
The long term commitment of NAM to the CD and nuclear weapons convention was portrayed 
in the October 2011 UN First Committee meeting where it contributed to the topic of nuclear 
weapons elimination by emphasizing  the importance of starting with the CD for a program with 
a detailed timeframe that will oversee the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Given that 
NAM is made up of 55% of the population of the world or two thirds of member states of the 
UN, it has the potential to play an important role in international negotiations on the topic 
(Laursen 2012, p. 12). 
NAC was established in 1998 as a result of the absence of progress on nuclear weapons 
disarmament by the NPT with the aim of reviving the debate on the need for non-proliferation 
and disarmament. NAC is a coalition of seven states from around the world (two of which are 
from Africa -SA and Egypt) who are considered to be middle powers and are in quest of the 
creation of a nuclear weapons free world (Laursen 2012, p. 12). Further to this, Laursen (2012, p. 
12) argues that “middle power diplomacy has been claimed to have had a crucial role in the 
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establishment of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, which includes the NPT, the various 
nuclear arms reductions treaties, the test ban treaties and the nuclear material export regulations.” 
Africa’s role in the NPT context (as an example) has, on the one hand, been non-uniform: South 
Africa had a special position for a very long time, while the same can be said for the North 
African states. Egypt is generally more concerned about the Middle East context than the African 
context. The same goes for many of the other Maghreb countries. The one thing that has united 
them has been the NAM. The problem with NAM, of course, is that it is a very large group, with 
no particular African angle on issues. The effect of all this, it could be argued, is that most 
African countries have been relatively disengaged from the multilateral nuclear disarmament 
debate, for quite a long time (Mr Hugo interviewed  19/11/2014). 
 
3.9 Summary 
From the discussion above, it can be concluded that Africa has had a long history with nuclear 
weapons from the early years of nuclear weapons testing to the present where the continent is 
now a NWFZ. Uranium mining and supply has been one of the major ways that Africa has 
contributed to the manufacturing of nuclear weapons as uranium is a key component in the 
process. Over the years, African states have opted to use uranium for peaceful purposes 
especially for nuclear power generation. In respect to nuclear weapons, South  
Africa stands out as the only country to have voluntarily disarmed and the continent as a whole 
also stands out through the enforcement of the Pelindaba Treaty that bans nuclear weapons on 
the continent, thus contributing to the call for disarmament. Even though it was observed that 
African states in general are not at the fore in championing nuclear disarmament following the 
signing of the Pelindaba Treaty, the efforts of a few African countries in pushing the 
disarmament agenda at multilateral groupings should not be overlooked but rather should be 
commended. The following chapter will look at disarmament on humanitarian grounds and the 
role that Africa has played in regards to this humanitarian initiative of nuclear weapons 
disarmament. 
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Chapter Four: Nuclear weapons disarmament and the humanitarian approach 
 
4.1Introduction  
An organisation that advocates for the abolition of nuclear weapons called the International 
Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) (n.d.) notes that: “Nuclear weapons are the only 
devices ever created that have the capacity to destroy all life on Earth.” Due to their 
destructiveness in nature, it led to many attempts by local and international communities to find 
ways and means of getting rid of this threat that could destroy all life. This chapter will primarily 
focus on the subjects of international and human security as well as IHL. This will be done by 
looking at the actual process of disarmament with particular emphasis on the humanitarian 
approach to nuclear weapon disarmament and how these efforts relate to the mentioned subjects. 
 
4.2 Examining the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons use 
Humanitarian efforts to ban WMD are not new in history. The respective banning of biological 
weapons in 1972 and chemical weapons in 1993 as well as the recent banning of conventional 
weaponry in the form of landmines and cluster munitions has all been attributed to the 
humanitarian initiative whose advocates focused their campaigns on the inhumane, 
indiscriminate and unacceptably harmful effects on innocent human beings that was caused by 
these weapons (Johnson, 2014). In addition, ICAN (n.d.) highlights that “the humanitarian threat 
posed by nuclear weapons can fairly be straight forward to solve. Compared to other global 
humanitarian and environmental challenges, such as climate change and poverty, a solution to 
the nuclear problem does not require comprehensive behavioural change, or restructuring of the 
global economic system.” Therefore if states were to be serious as they were with banning other 
WMD they would also succeed in getting rid of nuclear weapons on the planet. 
Regarding nuclear accidents the Fukushima (Japan in 2011) and Chernobyl (Ukraine in 1986) 
nuclear accidents serve as reminders to the dangers of radioactive release on people and the 
environment. In these two cases thousands of people were displaced from their homes in the 
areas close to and surrounding the nuclear plants, the health of the people were also affected as 
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there has been cases of radiation-related thyroid cancer and other forms of cancer on some 
people exposed to the radiation fall out (in the case of Chernobyl) (Steinhauser et al, 2014). 
Evidence produced by many studies and various meetings and conferences on the subject has 
shown that beyond the immediate devastation and deaths caused by nuclear weapon detonations, 
there are equally devastating consequences in the medium to long-term.  A nuclear weapons 
detonation seriously affects human and animal health, economic activities, agricultural 
production and the environment through the contamination and nuclear fall-out and is not 
confined to space and time (Swart, 2013, p.201).  It has a particularly devastating impact on 
developing countries that generally lack the necessary resources and support systems to manage 
the various effects of such an event (Combrink Interviewed 11/12/2014). 
 
4.2.1 Impact of a nuclear weapon detonation on people 
The results of a detonation of a nuclear weapon is that it could lead to the death of thousands or 
even millions of people over time depending on the size and the location of the bombing. The 
blast itself would not only flatten or destroy buildings and kill people within them. Also, people 
within kilometres from the blast would die from the shock waves, shattered glass and other lethal 
flying objects as a result of the blast. The fireball from the blasted nuclear weapon can reach over 
a million degrees Celsius making it impossible for nobody in the radius of the blast to survive the 
explosion. Not only would the blast burn people to death but it would also cause severe burns 
requiring immediate treatment, as well as spread mass fires to houses and forests (Atomic 
Archive n.d; Borrie & Caughley 2014; Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, n.d.). 
Radiation exposure as a result of the energy released from the blast would be lethal and result in 
death within days or weeks of exposure. Health problems relating to radiation exposure would 
also occur such as declining resistance to infections, damages to the nervous system and different 
types of cancer in the long term (Atomic Archives, n.d; Borrie & Caughley 2014). 
Another human impact of the blast would be the high numbers of displaced people caused by the 
blast. Due to infrastructure damages and exposure to radiation, it would cause people to lose 
their homes and vacate the affected areas for much safer zones. All the above mentioned 
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scenarios could also cause severe psychological effects to the survivors of the blast as that in 
itself would be a very traumatising experience with having to loose loved ones, health concerns, 
and the experience of being homeless (Borrie & Caughley 2014, p. 23-36).  
 
4.2.2 Impact on society 
The blast would also cause serious socio-economic damages. Not only would the blast damage 
houses but it would also damage structures such as roads, schools, hospitals, communication and 
transport networks (Borrie & Caughley 2014, p. 29). 
The blast would also have an effect on food security. The radiation fall out would affect farming 
land and contaminate water necessary for food production as was exemplified in the Chernobyl 
incident where the nuclear accident resulted in hundreds of thousands of hectares of land being 
removed from cultivation (Swart, 2013, p.201). According to ICAN (n.d.): “it would take only 
0,1% of the explosive yield of the current global nuclear arsenal to bring about devastating 
global agricultural collapse and widespread famine. This makes the continued existence and 
deployment of nuclear weapons into one of the most serious humanitarian problems of our time.” 
Affected areas would resort to importing food from safer regions which in turn would lead to 
increased food prices caused by the increase in demand. 
 The blast would also have an impact on the global economy. The damages to infrastructures and 
communication networks would hamper social and economic development. It would affect 
domestic, national, regional and even global trade as is evident with the September 11 events that 
followed the attack of the USA. It would  take years to stabilise the economic and financial chaos 
that would arise from the event of a nuclear weapon detonation (Dumas & Nelson, 2013, p. 53). 
Another challenge that would arise from the blast is that of the provision of humanitarian 
assistance to the bomb victims. The overwhelming number of injured by the blast would pose a 
number of challenges for those equipped to provide assistance.  This would undermine the ability 
of national staff to operate as they themselves would directly be affected by the blast. Not only 
that but there also would be logistical problems, communication problems, insufficient resources 
such as medical and health personnel and equipment and the lack of these would hamper 
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effective humanitarian assistance to the affected civilians ((Borrie & Caughley 2014; Ruff, 
2013).  
The effects of a nuclear weapon explosion are not constrained by national borders; as a result it 
should be an issue of deep concern shared by all states. On capabilities at national, regional and 
or international levels, the response to such an outcome as the denotation of a nuclear weapon 
would have many challenges. Based on a risk assessment carried out by the ICRC between 2006 
and 2009, the challenges faced by ICRC in its response to incidents of alleged use of nuclear, 
biological and chemical weapons it shows that “there is no adequate international response 
capacity that could address these consequences and assist the victims of a nuclear war, whatever 
its scale” (Swart 2013, p. 202). As the means to assist a substantial portion of survivors of a 
nuclear detonation are not currently available in most countries, and is not feasible at the 
international level. There is therefore a humanitarian imperative to prevent the use of nuclear 
weapons in the first place (Swart interviewed 06/03/ 2015).  
 
4.2.3 Impact on the environment 
The nuclear bomb would damage various sources of food and water due to radiation 
contamination. According to the nuclearfiles.org, the soot arising from the blast would have 
dangerous implications on global climate which would then affect global production. On top of 
that it is estimated that the world could witness some of the coldest temperatures ever recorded in 
over 1000 years. This would cause global disaster on temperatures across the world and, most 
importantly, on agriculture as farming seasons could be eliminated for over a decade. 
Research has also shown that “the ozone layer, which protects the surface of the Earth from 
harmful ultraviolet radiation, would be depleted by 40% over many inhabited areas and up to 
70% at the poles” (Jha 2006). This would result in the earth being vulnerable to all sorts of 
environmental changes. As the world would experience different weather patterns never 
experienced before which would affect the wellbeing of people. Needless to say the impact this 
would also have on wildlife both on land and water will be devastating. Radioactive fallout 
would result in food derived from plants and animals being too contaminated for consumption 
(Borrie & Caughley 2014, p. 23-36).   
 
 
 
 
53 
 
4.3 International and Human Security  
Fiore (2013) indicates that “International security consists of the measures taken by nations and 
international organizations, such as the United Nations, to ensure mutual survival and safety.” 
These measures comprise military action and diplomatic arrangements such as conventions and 
treaties e.g. the Pelindaba Treaty and the NPT that has a key role in articulating the call for the 
banning of nuclear weapons.  
Human security according to Gregoratti (2015) is an “approach to national and international 
security that gives primacy to human beings and their complex social and economic interactions. 
The concept of human security represents a departure from orthodox security studies, which 
focus on the security of the state. The subjects of the human security approach are individuals, 
and its end goal is the protection of people from traditional (i.e., military) and non-traditional 
threats such as poverty and disease.” Additionally with respect to the issue of human security 
Nanda (2009, p. 336) states that “the focus on human security is to ensure that adequate attention 
is given to addressing the real sources of insecurity from which so many people all over the 
world suffer. Nuclear weapons constitute a major source of people’s insecurity.” Many African 
states in recent years have emphasised the significance of dealing with human security at 
multiple levels to address the insecurities brought about by the existence of these nuclear 
weapons. Through making the continent a NWFZ, Africa demonstrated its commitment to 
safeguarding human security in the continent.  
NWS rely on nuclear weapons for security (Nanda 2009, p. 343) while other states especially 
those in NWFZs view those same weapons as a cause for insecurity. Even though nuclear 
weapons were acquired with the idea of ensuring national and territorial security, their existence 
poses a threat to international and human security. It can be argued that one of the main threats to 
international peace and security is caused by those NWS who are reluctant and have failed to 
disarm as was the provision in article VI of the NPT. Some states are still in possession of 
nuclear weapons and are not forthcoming in fulfilling the obligations they have of eventual 
disarmament and at the same time they prevent other states from seeking “security” in forms of 
possessing nuclear weapons. It has led to a lot of tension with some states withdrawing from the 
NPT and challenging this idea of only a select few being in possession of nuclear weapons, thus 
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they have also embarked on fulfilling their nuclear ambitions as is the case with North Korea. 
This then brings about insecurities for the international community as there is lack of trust.  
Nuclear weapons cannot and should not be considered as a source of security as they are in fact a 
source of insecurity. Stott cited in Swart (2013, p. 217) insists that “the only absolute guarantee 
against the use of nuclear weapons is their complete elimination and the assurance that they will 
never be produced again. The longer nuclear weapons are possessed, modernized and their use 
legally rationalized by some, the harder it will be to achieve their elimination or to prevent their 
proliferation.” Prevention is the best alternative to securing international peace and security.  
With that in mind, disarmament efforts try to address this challenge to international security. As 
a result, all efforts toward disarmament should be encouraged, supported and adhered to for the 
better purpose of international peace, stability and security. Both state and non-state actors work 
collectively to do away with these weapons and recently stakeholders have drawn on 
international humanitarian law, which focuses especially on aspects of human security to address 
the challenges of nuclear disarmament. 
 
4.4 International Humanitarian Law 
International Law is essential in the efforts of successfully controlling, limiting and eliminating 
nuclear weapons (Granoff & Granoff 2011, p. 54). “Not only does international law preclude the 
use of nuclear weapons, but it also precludes threats to use nuclear weapons” (Granoff & Granoff 
2011, p. 53). IHL serves as an important reference point in relation to the international legal 
framework pertaining to nuclear weapons. The goal for IHL is to limit the effects of armed 
conflict as well as inhumane means of armed conflict, which in turn would lessen human 
suffering 
Granoff & Granoff (2011, p. 54-55) summarize some of the rules that are at the core of IHL that 
define acceptable military conduct as follows: 
“Rule of distinction prohibits the use of a weapon that cannot discriminate in its effects 
between military and civilian targets. This law recognizes that the use of a particular 
weapon against a military target may cause unintended collateral or incidental damage to 
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civilians and objects and permits such damage, subject to compliance with the other 
applicable rules of law, including the rule of proportionality. However, the weapon must 
have been intended for and capable of being controlled and directed against a specific 
military target, and the civilian damage must have been unintended.  
Rule of proportionality prohibits the use of a weapon if its probable effects upon non-
combatant persons or objects would likely be disproportionate to the achievement of a 
specific, legitimate military objective. 
Rule of necessity provides that in conducting a military operation, a state may use only 
such a level of force against its adversary as is necessary or imperatively necessary to 
achieve its military objective, and that any additional level of force is unlawful.  
Corollary requirement of controllability means that the rules of distinction, 
proportionality, and necessity prohibit the use of weapons whose effects cannot be 
controlled by the user.” 
When applying the above highlighted IHL to the use of nuclear weapons, “it becomes clear that 
these weapons cannot comply with international law. The effects of nuclear weapons are 
inherently uncontrollable and do not meet international criteria for discrimination between 
military and civilian targets, for proportionality, and for necessity” (Granoff & Granoff 2011, p. 
53). However, IHL does not directly address the issue of nuclear weapons thereby making it 
difficult to charge people for violations of an internationally binding law which is not addressed 
in the conventions. This is why there is the issue on noncompliance or lack of interest by NWS 
in disarmament. If there was an international law banning nuclear weapons on the other hand 
based on the devastating impact they bring to humanity as well as the threat they pose to 
international peace and security, then legally it would be possible to bring these NWS to book. 
 
4.5 Nuclear Disarmament 
The Collins English dictionary defines nuclear disarmament as “the gradual reduction and 
eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons in the world”. From this definition, the various 
treaties that were discussed in the previous chapters (and of course the numerous not mentioned), 
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mostly address the “gradual” aspect of the definition whereas the humanitarian approach of 
nuclear weapons disarmament focuses on the “elimination” aspect of the definition as this 
approach not only questions the existence of nuclear weapons but calls for total abolition of 
nuclear weapons in the entire world. 
In the first paragraph of the Preamble of the NPT, it addresses the humanitarian concerns of 
nuclear weapons as it states that “considering the devastation that would be visited upon all 
mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of 
such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples…”. This shows that among 
others, the discussions leading to the Treaty had its basis on the humanitarian impact of nuclear 
weapons use. 
Much focus on disarmament has been on the technical aspects, as well as the military and 
security reasons for their existence and not on the humanitarian aspect. The destructive nature of 
nuclear weapons and their inability to distinguish between military targets and civilians raises 
questions of how humanitarian rules can be observed as they would be targeted at populated 
areas (as was the case with Hiroshima and Nagasaki). The humanitarian approach therefore calls 
for the disarmament and eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons as the humanitarian 
consequences of their use are unacceptable. 
The humanitarian initiative also paves the way for other stakeholders to participate/contribute in 
nuclear weapons discussion, from what was previously only a state/ government centred debate. 
The humanitarian approach draws into the debate other actors such as civil society thereby 
making it possible for the ordinary citizen to take part and have a say in the discussion and not 
just the “expert” in the field. 
 
4.6 Humanitarian approach to nuclear weapons disarmament 
The lack of progress in a number of forums that focus on nuclear non-proliferation and 
disarmament such as the NPT and the Conference on Disarmament have resulted in a number of 
Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and states (especially NNWS) to find other means of 
strengthening the debate around nuclear weapons disarmament. The objective of these 
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stakeholders is to shift the attention of the world to focus on the humanitarian impact of nuclear 
weapons, stressing the point that the onus for disarmament does not only lay with NWS, but it 
being the obligation of all states collectively (Broodryk 2014). “This development is attributed to 
factors such as increased attention to international humanitarian law in relations among states, 
and a growing public awareness driven by scientists and physicians of the impact of any use of 
nuclear weapons on the global environment, climate, and agricultural resources,” (Borrie and 
Caughley 2013, p. 08). 
According to Stott (2013) “a nuclear weapon detonation, whether intentional or accidental, could 
have catastrophic short- and long-term humanitarian, economic, developmental and 
environmental effects. Such a detonation would have global implications.” It is then unfortunate 
that despite the obvious impact the use of nuclear weapons would have on humanity, it is only 
recently that most nuclear weapon debates have revolved around the international security and 
military perspective and not the humanitarian perspective. This brings in the need the debate to 
focus on the impact on human beings and not on state security. This call for a shift was asserted 
by the former ICRC president Jakob Kellenberger (cited in Swart 2013, p. 203) who argues that 
“the currency of this debate must ultimately be about human beings, about the fundamental rules 
of international humanitarian law, and about the collective future of humanity.” 
Much focus on the humanitarian approach to disarmament started in 2010. Since then, a number 
of activities have taken place that have helped to highlight the humanitarian impact of nuclear 
weapons as well as reshape the discourse of nuclear weapons (Broodryk 2014). These activities 
have been through anti-nuclear weapons campaigns carried out by organisations such as ICAN, 
awareness campaigns on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons use, and debates 
and discussions in various multilateral groupings on ways of pushing the disarmament agenda 
based on humanitarian grounds. 
In addition, some disarmament activists such as the ICRC call for the application of the 
additional protocols of IHL to the use of nuclear weapons, protocols such as “distinction, 
proportionality and the prohibition on causing superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering” 
(Swart 2013, p. 198). There are treaties that limit/prohibits certain aspects of possession, testing 
and or use of nuclear weapons but no international law that focuses solely on banning nuclear 
weapons. The main principles of IHL were established in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and 
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the additional protocols of 1977. However, it is unfortunate that in these instruments there is no 
explicit mention of nuclear weapons, even though the IHL general principles apply (Swart 2013, 
p. 197). 
According to Borrie and Caughley (2013, p. 6-7) the plan to use nuclear weapons in warfare 
must be in line with IHL where there is a clear distinction between targets and non-targets as 
well as to limit collateral damage through the protection of civilians something that nuclear 
weapons are not capable of distinguishing due to their levels of destruction in radius. 
Furthermore Borrie and Caughley (2013, p. 07) observe that the “humanitarian approaches offer 
useful starting points for pressing policymakers to explain how such contradictions are 
reconcilable, and to adjust their actions accordingly with a view to civilian protection.” 
As states have taken up initiatives to refine their weapons, to be more powerful than those bombs 
originally dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the results of the impact after the use of these 
refined weapons are unquestionable. It would have severe impact on life, environment, food 
production, global climate and societies at large. The humanitarian approach therefore provides a 
powerful framework for nuclear weapons disarmament. 
As stated previously, the humanitarian approach has been credited for the successful banning of 
other forms of WMD such as biological and chemical weapons and as such the humanitarian 
approach may increase value to multilateral negotiation processes on international security. As 
the main focus of the initiative is that of human suffering that will be caused by the detonation of 
such weapons, it appeals to a wider audience outside the interests of just political/state actors. It 
involves other stakeholders such as CSOs that advocate in the health, economic, social and 
development sectors. The approach therefore centres on promoting human security and 
protecting the individual from violence and insecurity. 
One challenge to the humanitarian initiative is that it fails to draw the attention of all relevant 
stakeholders more especially the permanent members of the UN Security Council. States should 
therefore look for other ways of strengthening the disarmament initiative that will draw the 
attention of all parties such as an initiative that focuses on legally banning nuclear weapons. 
Chapter two highlighted the importance of treaties in solving various nuclear weapon problems. 
As such, over the years the world has witnessed the commitment and dedication of many states 
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in addressing the challenges posed by nuclear weapons. Although not all treaties were as 
effective as they lacked the commitment of some key actors to render them effective, they have 
been instrumental in addressing the concerns of the international community. The next step is a 
treaty that will ban nuclear weapons in efforts of securing international peace, stability and 
security. The treaty which participants of the humanitarian initiative support will address the 
threat of the possibility of a nuclear weapon detonation which would cause catastrophic damage 
to the entire globe and affect all living being. 
The humanitarian approach aims to break the deadlock that is experienced in nuclear 
disarmament by following the model of banning other inhumane weapons, e.g. the Landmine 
Ban Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention. There have been three conferences (in 
Norway, Mexico and Austria respectively) to promote the humanitarian approach. 
 
4.7 Conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons 
So far there have been three conferences on disarmament that focused on the humanitarian 
impact of nuclear weapons use. The first was held in Oslo, Norway in March 2013, followed by 
the Nayarit conference in Mexico in February 2014 and the Vienna conference in Austria in 
December of 2014. According to the Reaching Critical Will Organisation (2013 & 2014) these 
conferences drew various stakeholders such as state actors, experts in the field of nuclear 
weapons, international organisations as well as nongovernmental organisations that specialise in 
public health, environmental issues, economic and developmental issues, human assistance, 
climate change, food security, and risk management. 
4.7.2 Oslo Conference 
The Oslo conference primarily focused on the effects of nuclear weapons denotation. 
Discussions were on the impact that it would have on economies, development, human health, 
the environment and many more. As the first ever conference on the humanitarian impacts of 
nuclear weapons, the Oslo meeting, which took place on the 4th and 5th of March 2013 was 
attended by government representatives, UN agencies and other international organisations (11), 
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and civil society organisations (5). There were 34 African states that took part in the Oslo 
conference out of a total of 127 states that participated. 
Of key note is that the five permanent members of the UN Security Council boycotted the 
conference and only two states in possession of nuclear weapons (India and Pakistan) attended 
the conference (Fihn & Acheson 2013). This shows how NWS are reluctant to take all necessary 
measures that will lead to disarmament. The contributions of all parties (nuclear haves and the 
have not’s) would have been important in pushing the agenda on disarmament forward in this 
regard. In addition, as the conference aimed to address the dangers that nuclear weapons pose to 
international peace and security, it would have been right for those members that sit on the 
Security Council to be involved in addressing the concerns of the international community on the 
humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. 
Many of the states that participated agreed that the weapons had devastating consequences and 
certain states admitted that they were not capable to effectively prepare for a nuclear weapons 
detonation e.g. Brazil, SA and Zambia. Some states, such as Sudan, Sierra Leone and Zambia 
called for a ban on nuclear weapons where as other states like Mozambique and Nigeria 
criticised the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines and the modernisation of these 
weapons (Acheson 2013).  
The Reaching Critical Will Organisation (2013) further reported on some of the speeches made 
by participants at the Vienna conference. Some of the African states had the following to say:  
Algeria through its delegates acknowledged the importance of the conference as a step forward 
towards disarmament which relates to/results in international peace and security. Speaking 
mainly as an African state that has experienced the consequences of nuclear weapon testing, 
Algeria highlighted the need to learn from Hiroshima, Nagasaki and other cases and find suitable 
approaches to overcome the effects of nuclear weapons. Algeria also drew attention to concerns 
pertaining to the lack of preparedness; international cooperation and technical assistance at 
international, regional and national level in situations relating to nuclear weapons detonation. 
Nigeria through its delegation voiced its condemnation of nuclear weapons and insisted that the 
best way of preparedness was through the prevention of a nuclear explosion as the international 
community is not prepared to address the consequences. Nigeria stated that the biggest threat to 
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humanity lay in nuclear weapons and it argued that the total elimination of nuclear weapons was 
necessary as it is the best and more credible guarantee to international security. 
Zambia joined in the call for the total ban of nuclear weapons and expressed its concern in that 
nuclear weapons are not included in the agreement banning WMD yet they are perhaps the most 
destructive weapons of mass destruction. Zambia also emphasised its commitment to fight 
against proliferation and join hands with states that are committed to world peace processes. 
Egypt stressed that nuclear disarmament was top on its priority and foreign policy objectives as 
exemplified in its promotion of the agenda on the international scene. Because nuclear weapons 
pose a threat to the survival of humanity, Egypt like Nigeria argued that the best and effective 
guarantee in eliminating this threat to humanity is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.   
Much of the discourse was centred on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons use 
which was a shift from the traditional dialogue on the significance of nuclear weapons to state 
security (Fihn & Acheson 2013). The three key findings of the conference can be summarised as 
“no state or international body could adequately address the humanitarian emergency caused by 
a nuclear weapon detonation; that nuclear weapons have demonstrated devastating immediate 
and long-term effects; and that such effects will not be constrained by national borders, and will 
have a regional and global impact” (Fihn & Acheson 2013). 
Despite the non-commitment by the seven NWS to the humanitarian initiative, Fihn & Acheson 
(2013) argue that “in the end, the conference was important not only because it provided the 
space needed to reframe the discourse around nuclear weapons, but also because it was a 
significant first move towards negotiations of a treaty banning nuclear weapons.” 
4.7.3 Nayarit Conference 
The Nayarit conference was a follow-up conference to the Oslo meeting. It took place from the 
13th-14th of February 2014 in Mexico. The number of states that participated in the second 
conference was more than the first conference with 146 states compared to the 127 states that 
attended in the previous year. In summary, some of the key issues that were discussed at the 
conference as noted by Acheson, Fihn & Harrison 2014 were: 
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• “Reconstruction of infrastructure and regeneration of economic activities, trade, 
communications, health facilities, and schools would take several decades, causing 
profound social and political harm. 
• Radiation exposure could result in short and long-term negative effects in every organ of 
the human body and would increase cancer risks and future hereditary pathologies. 
• Today the risk of nuclear weapons use is growing globally as a consequence of 
proliferation, the vulnerability of nuclear command and control networks to cyber-attacks 
and to human error, and potential access to nuclear weapons by non-state actors, in 
particular terrorist groups. 
• As more countries deploy more nuclear weapons on higher levels of combat readiness, 
the risks of accidental, mistaken, unauthorized or intentional use of these weapons grow 
significantly. 
• It is a fact that no State or international organization has the capacity to address or 
provide the short and long term humanitarian assistance and protection needed in case of 
a nuclear weapon explosion. Moreover, it would not be possible to establish such 
capacities, even if attempted.” 
As such, many states were explicitly vocal on the need for a total ban including some African 
states in attendance as Acheson, Fihn & Harrison (2014) highlight: “Tanzania and Nigeria 
expressed concern that there is no international treaty banning these weapons of mass destruction 
and stressed the absolute necessity to abolish them from earth. Malawi stated that the 
conferences in Nayarit and Oslo have cemented the conviction among states that nuclear 
weapons must be banned once and for all and that it is the duty of states to start the negotiations 
of a legally-binding ban.” 
Of course there were other states at the meeting that also drew attention to the need for nuclear 
weapons on the international stage, states such as German, Pakistan, India, Canada and the 
Netherlands highlighted the key role nuclear weapons played during the cold war as their 
presence had contributed to keeping peace for the international community at that time. 
However, the call for the need to eliminate nuclear weapons on humanitarian grounds 
outweighed the remarks made by these few states who justified the existence of nuclear weapons 
(Acheson, Fihn & Harrison 2014). 
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4.7.4 Vienna Conference 
The Vienna conference on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons was the most recent 
meeting that took place on the 8th and 9th of December 2014. To date, it is the conference that has 
drawn the most attendance. Austria’s Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs 
recorded that 158 states were in attendance at the conference and of those 158 states, 45 were 
from the African continent which is a total representation of almost 84% of all African states. As 
the number of states participating in the conference has grown in the two years since it first 
started to almost 160 state representatives in the Vienna meeting, this shows that there is an 
increase in the official government concern, also in Africa about nuclear weapons disarmament 
(Wilson 2015, p. 50). The conference also attracted a larger number of international 
organisations (21) and CSO’s (53) compared to the previous conferences. At the conference, 
African states were very vocal on many issues regarding disarmament on humanitarian grounds.  
The Reaching Critical Will Organisation (2014) reported on some of the speeches made at the 
conference , among them was a message at the Vienna conference delivered on behalf of Pope 
Francis by Archbishop Silvano Maria Tomasi who stated: 
“The desire for peace, security and stability is one of the deepest longings of the human 
heart…. This desire can never be satisfied by military means alone, much less the 
possession of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction… peace must be 
built on justice, socio-economic development, freedom, respect for fundamental human 
rights, the participation of all in public affairs and the building of trust between peoples.” 
 Furthermore, the Archbishop argued that “while the focus is often placed on nuclear weapons’ 
potential for mass killing, more attention must be given to the “unnecessary suffering” brought 
on by their use. Military codes and international law, among others, have long banned peoples 
from inflicting unnecessary suffering. If such suffering is banned in the waging of conventional 
war, then it should all the more be banned in nuclear conflict.” 
The Reaching Critical Will Organisation (2014) further reported on some of the speeches made 
by participants at the Vienna conference; some of the African states had the following to say:  
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The South African government highlighted that the humanitarian imperative was key to the 
country’s efforts of voluntarily dismantling its nuclear arsenal; therefore its government not only 
has the legal obligation as the only state to have ever disarmed, but they also have the moral 
responsibility to contribute to the humanitarian initiative of nuclear weapons disarmament for the 
sake of future generations.  Speaking at the conference, the Nigerian ambassador to Switzerland 
H.E Humphrey Ummuna Orjiako spoke of the concerns that Nigeria had about the lack of 
progress in disarmament 68 years after a resolution was carried out by the UN that would foresee 
a nuclear free world and he emphasised the need for all states to rededicate themselves to the 
total elimination of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, Mr Aubrey Kabisala, speaking on 
behalf of the Malawian government, said that the country is in support of all disarmament efforts 
and willing to cooperate with all relevant stakeholders to achieve the goal of a world free of 
nuclear weapons.  
Furthermore, the Kenyan government shared their concerns on the continuation of some NWS to 
maintain and modernise their arsenals which poses as a risk of possible use and as the impact of 
the detonation knows no boundaries or borders, it could certainly also effect Africa. Speaking on 
behalf of the Zimbabwean government, Ambassador Mutandiro emphasised the shared 
responsibility that states have be it NWS and NNWS towards global peace and security and 
retaliated that weapons that threaten humanity should never be morally justified as some states 
have done. Whereas the Zambian ambassador H.E Sinjela indicated that her country was in full 
support of the ban of nuclear weapons and welcomed the humanitarian initiative as a step 
towards that goal, the Reaching Critical Will (2014) organisation reported. 
Overall, the conference addressed the devastating implications of nuclear weapons use as in the 
previous meetings. In addition, the key findings of the Vienna conference were summarised by 
the chair of the meeting which was reported by the Reaching Critical Will Organisation (2014) 
namely that nuclear weapon testing has demonstrated that the results of nuclear detonation has an 
immediate, mid and long term effect. This was from what was witnessed in various regions 
where tests were carried out that left a bequest of severe health and environmental consequences. 
Also, it was observed that, for as long as these weapons exist, there is a possibility that they will 
one day be used intentionally or otherwise therefore it was imperative that the world does away 
with this threat. The need for security for all was underscored and it was agreed that the only 
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way of ensuring this security was via a complete elimination of nuclear weapons. In addition, 
many of the delegations agreed that a legal framework should be pursued to achieve total 
elimination of nuclear weapons including a nuclear weapons convention to outlaw nuclear 
weapons. 
 
4.8 Role of African states and other stakeholders in the humanitarian initiative 
The NNWS can address the problem of nuclear weapons as from all the states in the world (194) 
only nine  have nuclear weapons; therefore NNWS have the legitimacy as well as the strength in 
numbers to take action and call for a universal ban of nuclear weapons. The responsibility should 
not be left to the nuclear haves as thus far they have not made progress in general and complete 
disarmament but only decreasing the numbers of their arsenals and advancing them to be more 
destructive. 
Kwame Nkrumah, in 1960, speaking at a conference for Peace and Security in Africa in Accra 
Ghana was quoted by Broodryk (2014) as saying, “We in Africa wish to live and develop. We 
are not freeing ourselves from centuries of imperialism and colonialism only to be maimed and 
destroyed by nuclear weapons. We do not threaten anyone and we renounce the foul weapons 
that threaten the very existence of life on this planet.” African states have shown their dedication 
to the NPT through their commitment not to produce or use nuclear weapons. Further through 
the Pelindaba Treaty they secured the continent to be a NWFZ and as such, they have fulfilled 
their obligations. NWS on the other hand have shown little effort in keeping their end of the 
bargain (of the NPT) of meaningful nuclear disarmament. 
African states play a significant role in international negotiations as exemplified through their 
contribution to the negotiations of the banning of anti-personnel landmines and cluster 
munitions. Such negotiation capabilities and the successful turning of the continent to a NWFZ, 
give African states legitimacy to call for universal nuclear disarmament. Africa can contribute in 
the shifting of the emphasis from the aspects of state security to that of the consequences of 
nuclear detonation. The AU can be a key vehicle in engineering Africa’s contribution to the 
humanitarian approach to disarmament (Swart, 2013, p. 213-215). Moreover, Swart (2013:215) 
argues that “any state that actively proposes a prohibition on nuclear weapons must be seen as 
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acting in the best interests of humanity.” This therefore gives African states the opportunity to 
play an active role similar to one they carried out when they negotiated the Pelindaba Treaty, by 
collectively taking a stand to ban nuclear weapons completely. They will be acting not only in 
the best interest of the continent, but in the interest of all humanity. 
Organisations such as ISS, ILPI and the ICRC have been very active and influential in pushing 
the discourse of the humanitarian approach. In 2011 the Council of Delegates of the International 
Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement appealed to all states to make sure that nuclear weapons 
are never used again. The ICRC was present and made a statement during the Oslo, Nayarit and 
Vienna meetings, noting that the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons 
should be no longer ignored. Likewise, according to Ms Swart (Interviewed 06/03/2015) the 
ICRC welcome the fact that, for the first time in nuclear age, states seem to have expanded the 
discourse on nuclear weapons and are focusing on their humanitarian impact. The new 
information from the conferences on the humanitarian initiative about health and environmental 
effects and the absence of an adequate assistance capacity in most states should prompt a 
reassessment of nuclear weapons by all states in both legal and policy terms.  
Ms Swart further argues that “the ICRC believes that…the risk of nuclear weapon use and 
ensuring their elimination through a legally binding international agreement is a humanitarian 
imperative. The ICRC call on all states to establish a time-bound framework to negotiate such a 
legally binding agreement and to consider the form that such an agreement should take.” Thanks 
to these conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, the global community now 
has a much clearer understanding of the threat that nuclear weapons pose if ever used 
intentionally or accidentally detonated; and the effects such a detonation would have on people, 
society and the environment. These matters have given African states a framework to contribute 
to an approach on disarmament that has a history in Africa’s response to nuclear weapon dating 
back to Kwame Nkrumah’s interventions in the 1960s. 
 
4.9 Summary 
The evidence provided in this chapter has shown that nuclear weapons are indeed the most 
destructive, inhumane and indiscriminate weapons ever created.  Not only do they have the 
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potential to kill millions of civilians, their use also have devastating short and long term effects. 
The evidence has also shown that the humanitarian approach to disarmament works to the 
advantage of humanity in general as it is derived from the rationality of positive sum games. As 
such this approach is more appealing to the wider community. The responsibility to call for 
disarmament therefore rests with all states. Not one particular state is safe from experiencing the 
consequences of a detonated nuclear weapon nor prepared or equipped to handle an incident of 
such magnitude. Providing humanitarian assistance in such a scenario would be inadequate and 
as a result there is need to eliminate the threat of such an event from ever taking place through 
disarmament and the eventual total elimination of nuclear weapons which the humanitarian 
initiative advocates. African states have been vocal in supporting this initiative.  
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Chapter Five: Analysis and Findings  
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on using the evidence gathered and the analysis in the previous chapters to 
explain Africa’s contribution to the humanitarian initiative as per the following research 
question: “How has the Pelindaba Treaty contributed towards the humanitarian approach of 
nuclear weapons disarmament?” To start off, this chapter will give a brief description of the 
contribution as pertaining to the research question and a distinction between a direct and an 
indirect contribution. This will then be followed by an assessment of Africa’s contribution to the 
initiative which will be explained in six sections relating to the sub questions listed in chapter 
one, namely:  The first section will explain the Treaty’s contribution to the humanitarian 
approach to nuclear weapon disarmament, the second section deals with the Treaty’s 
contribution to overall nuclear weapons disarmament, the third section will explain Africa’s 
contribution to the humanitarian approach. Finally, the last section will explain the limitations to 
Africa’s engagement in the global nuclear order.  
 
 
5.2 Direct and indirect contribution 
 
As the main purpose of this research is to assess Africa’s contribution to the humanitarian 
approach of nuclear weapon disarmament, this section will clarify the difference between direct 
and indirect contribution. Direct contribution will focus on the actual actions undertaken by 
Africa in advancing the humanitarian cause. So these actions could be in ways such as Africa’s 
engagements in discussions directly relating to the humanitarian initiative as well as other efforts 
undertaken to push the humanitarian agenda.  Indirect contribution deals with the actions that 
were taken to serve a different purpose but the results of which can also be linked to or have 
impacted on the humanitarian approach. Further to this, indirect contribution will also be in form 
of the discursive groundwork before 2013 that allowed the initiative to manifest as an approach 
to nuclear disarmament.    
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5.3 The Pelindaba Treaty and the humanitarian approach to disarmament 
The Pelindaba Treaty did not contribute directly to the humanitarian initiative of nuclear weapon 
disarmament. The Pelindaba Treaty was signed at time when the world was calling for 
disarmament of nuclear weapons based on military grounds and resulted in African states 
entering into a Treaty that would forestall the use of nuclear weapons on African soil. This 
Treaty as at the time it was signed focused only on disarmament of nuclear weapons on military 
grounds and territorial security amongst African states. The Pelindaba Treaty opened for 
signature in 1996 which was 14 years before the humanitarian initiative was launched in 2010. 
Furthermore, the Treaty came into force in 2009 which is a year before the humanitarian 
approach gained ground. Owing to the time difference between the establishment of this Treaty 
and the call for disarmament on humanitarian grounds, the Pelindaba Treaty has not directly 
contributed to the humanitarian approach of nuclear weapons disarmament. 
The Treaty however did contribute indirectly to the humanitarian initiative as Mr Michiel 
Combrink (11/12/2014) notes that despite the Treaty’s inability to contribute directly to the 
humanitarian initiative; the Treaty still made an important contribution towards the achievement 
of a world without nuclear weapons, which is the key objective of the humanitarian initiative 
towards nuclear weapons disarmament. Also, like with other treaties such as the NTP where 
humanitarian concerns were central to the drafting of the treaty, even though the text of the 
Pelindaba Treaty does not explicitly address the humanitarian concerns, it does not imply that the 
negotiations of the Treaty itself were not influenced by humanitarian concerns of nuclear 
weapons use. This is supported by Mr Michiel Combrink (11/12/2014) who argues that state 
parties to the Pelindaba Treaty are able to support any effective measures in the implementation 
of the nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments of the possessors of nuclear weapons.  
Beyond strict non-proliferation obligations and the commitment towards a world without nuclear 
weapons, the Pelindaba Treaty also emphasizes and commits state parties to high levels of 
nuclear safety and nuclear security, which in itself contributes to preventing a humanitarian 
catastrophe resulting from the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. It therefore can be 
argued that the Pelindaba Treaty contributes indirectly to the humanitarian initiative of nuclear 
weapons disarmament 
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In addition, the Pelindaba Treaty also indirectly contributed to prepare the ground for this 
approach, because NWFZs are among other concerns based on concerns about the humanitarian 
consequences of nuclear weapon detonation, and the Pelindaba Treaty is no different – it refers 
to the Cairo and other declarations that are explicit about humanitarian concerns. Furthermore, it 
helped establish a moral high ground for Africa that makes its support for the humanitarian 
approach more real/sincere than for example India and Pakistan who have nuclear weapons. The 
whole continent has denounced these weapons;  which brings us to the point that the Pelindaba 
Treaty did consolidate a unanimous position on nuclear weapons, namely that there are no place 
for them and that they contribute to insecurity rather than security. Not only are they negative for 
state security, but the basis on which Africa denounced nuclear weapons can be related to human 
security, e.g. the fact that the Pelindaba Treaty includes denouncing the dumping of nuclear 
waste on African territory, which is negative for people’s health. This relates to the humanitarian 
approach and makes the Pelindaba Treaty indirectly a powerful foundation for Africa’s support 
of the humanitarian approach. This we see in how African countries participate in the 
conferences on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. So the Pelindaba Treaty set 
the stage for this participation. 
 
5.4 The Pelindaba Treaty and nuclear weapons disarmament 
Africa’s past role in the nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament regime has 
predominantly focused on the nuclear weapons capabilities of the Apartheid Regime in South 
Africa. According to Mr Michiel Combrink (Interviewed 11/12/2014), several African leaders 
condemned the development of such capabilities by the regime, which threatened fellow African 
countries and the continent as a whole.  Although the efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free 
zone in Africa was taken a long time ago by the Organisation for African Unity (OAU), this only 
came to fruition after the decision by South Africa to abandon its nuclear weapons and to join the 
NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State in 1991. The ability for South Africa to dismantle their 
nuclear weapons was a major contribution to the call for disarmament as not only did it decrease 
the number of states with nuclear weapons and strengthen the disarmament cause but it also 
made it possible for the African region to become a NWFZ. Ms Sarah Swart (Interviewed 
06/03/2015) also argues that with South Africa being the only state in the world to have 
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voluntarily dismantled its nuclear weapons program, South Africa, the sub-region and the whole 
continent have the moral authority, even responsibility to stand for nuclear disarmament.  
Moreover, geographically, five regions now have denounced nuclear weapons in their zones (of 
which Africa is part of) making it a total of 115 states that are party to NWFZs. In addition, a 
total of 146 states are against nuclear weapons and in support of a treaty to ban these weapons as 
ICAN (n.d) notes. This implies that out of the 196 states in the world the majority of them (146) 
are in favour of seeing a world free of nuclear weapons and African states are among this 
majority.  
The signing of the Pelindaba Treaty and of course other Treaties exemplifies the commitment of 
states to the liberal institutionalism theory as their efforts contributes towards securing regional 
and international security. As it was highlighted in chapter one where Devitt (2011) noted that 
one of the arguments of liberal institutionalism is states need to collaborate even if it is to an 
extent of giving up some of their sovereignty if there is to be peace in international affairs. This 
shows Africas determination towards that goal as the continent was able to create an “integrated 
community” in a bid to securing regional and international security.  
 
5.5 Africa and the humanitarian initiative to nuclear weapon disarmament 
Since the inception of the humanitarian approach to disarmament, African states have 
contributed greatly to the initiative. Africa has helped in strengthening the approach in various 
ways. In terms of numbers, in the three conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear 
weapons use that have taken place (in Oslo, Nayarit and Vienna), it was witnessed that the 
number of African states increased from 34 in the first meeting to 45 in the last meeting. This 
alone indicates the determination and commitment by these African states to the initiative. It 
only requires the remaining nine states to participate in the conferences on the humanitarian 
impact of nuclear weapons for there to be a unanimous stand from an African state perspective 
which can be achieved in future conferences as they did with their contribution towards the 
Pelindaba Treaty. 
Looking at their contribution in terms of engagements in the actual debates and gatherings, many 
African states have been explicit and very vocal about their concerns of the existence of nuclear 
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weapons and the need for a legally binding framework that will ban nuclear weapons there by 
eliminating them completely from existence. This is so despite their allegiances with some NWS, 
so to be able to speak out on the international scene to voice their humanitarian concern of 
nuclear weapons use without fear of that impacting their relations with some key NWS who are 
also major donors to most of these African states is commendable. 
In terms of the roles played by non-state actors in the humanitarian initiative, many African 
CSOs have been at the fore in contributing towards strengthening of the initiative. Like with the 
increase in numbers of states participating in the conferences, the numbers of CSOs has also 
increased based on a 2014 report by Austria’s Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign 
Affairs. This increase can be attributed to efforts of many CSOs from the African continent such as 
the ISS, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, African universities, and some 
international human rights organisations such as the Red Cross, just to mention a few who have 
attended the conferences. Their input and activism based on the research they conduct and 
experiences have contributed to the call made at the conferences for a ban on nuclear weapons. 
As mentioned in chapter three that the issue of nuclear weapons is not new on the African 
continent, which has resulted in Africa engaging in various dialogues on the topic. Africa has 
proven to be an influential block in other processes towards the prohibition of weapons that 
cause excessive injury or that are indiscriminate, such as anti-personnel mines and cluster 
munitions.  As such, Africa’s engagement in the ongoing debate about possible policy responses 
to the existential threat posed by nuclear weapons is therefore valuable. The humanitarian focus 
has allowed Africa to recognize that it will be equally, if not more, affected by a nuclear war.  
The issue of nuclear disarmament is therefore not only part of some general global goal towards 
international peace and security, but an issue that has a direct impact on African countries which 
should remain high on Africa’s continental agenda argues Mr Michiel Combrink (Interviewed 
11/12/2014). 
Africa can play a critically important role in moving the humanitarian initiative forward, but this 
will require consolidation and leadership. According to Mr Torbjorn Graff Hugo (Interviewed 
19/11/2014), the 54 African states need to agree on what they want out of it in terms of political 
response, and to set up a structure that allows for the effective promotion of this goal. A 
declaration along the lines of the Livingstone declaration (on cluster munitions) is one way to go 
 
 
 
 
73 
 
about it. Another is for a small core group of African states to take up a leadership role that 
others can follow. 
South Africa and a few African states have been active participants in the humanitarian initiative 
since its inception. Mr Michiel Combrink (Interviewed 11/12/2014) highlights that South Africa 
was one of the 16 countries that delivered the first joint statement on this issue at the NPT’s 
Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference.  At the 2013 NPT Preparatory 
Committee, South Africa delivered a joint statement on behalf of 80 State Parties – the largest 
cross-regional group to ever deliver a statement during any NPT meeting.  South Africa also 
associated with the statements delivered at the UN General Assembly First Committee sessions 
in 2012 (supported by 35 States), 2013 (supported by 128 States) and 2014 (supported by 156 
States).  In addition, many African states such as Mozambique, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Sudan, 
South Africa and Zambia have also participated in the International Conferences on the 
Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons hosted by Norway in 2013, Mexico in 2014, and 
Austria in December 2014 thus contributing to the discourse on disarmament.  
 
5.6 Limitations to Africa’s engagement in the global nuclear order 
However, there are limitations to Africa’s contribution in that although most African countries 
participate in these conferences, not all are equally vocal and activist in pushing this approach. 
The reasons for this as other security issues taking preference and some African countries being 
aligned to NWS. So it is the ‘usual suspects’ (SA, Nigeria, etc.) who invest diplomatic resources 
in supporting this approach. More can be done to take advantage of Africa’s history in the 
nuclear order and its establishment of the Pelindaba Treaty. Mr Hugo’s argument is of great 
relevance, namely that the continent has to find a political aim in this area that they want to 
achieve and a strategy to achieve it.  
Another limitation to Africa’s engagement is that the nuclear weapons issue is overshadowed by 
other security issues in Africa that seem more pressing. Africa’s involvement in the call for 
universal disarmament still remains a challenge. Only a select few African countries advocate for 
disarmament especially on the grounds of humanitarian consequences outside the three 
conferences that have taken place. After joining the NPT and the Pelindaba Treaty, most African 
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states appear to have taken a follower’s role in the drive for a world free of nuclear weapons. It 
could be that by signing these treaties the nuclear weapons issue ceased to be of great concern to 
these states; therefore the international community only witnesses the efforts of a select few 
African states actively engaging in matters of nuclear weapons especially in relation to 
disarmament. Also, as was noted in chapter three, it seems like this passiveness is also linked to 
the belief that nuclear weapons are an “issue” for the first world countries rather than African 
states struggling with issues, such as poverty. This limitation on its engagement has led to the 
continent as a whole not being able to push the humanitarian initiative of nuclear weapon 
disarmament as far as is potentially possible. After parties to the Pelindaba Treaty secured the 
region, most states seem to be lacklustre to further contributions to disarmament even in pushing 
the humanitarian agenda. 
Over the years, it seems like people have become complacent when it comes to the issue of 
nuclear weapons and the threat these pose. Wilson (2015, p. 51) refers to past events by 
highlighting how in the 1960s, hundreds of thousands of people protested against nuclear 
weapons while in the 1980s millions of people across the world also protested against the 
existence of nuclear weapons. However the situation has changed especially in the 21st century 
where only a select few organisations such as ICAN have taken up the task of protesting while it 
seems the rest of the international community is complacent. 
Wilson (2015, p. 51) further highlights how history has shown that mass protests against nuclear 
weapons matter as it has led to the limitation of nuclear weapons in the 1960s and 1980s. 
Therefore, if states were to take up similar measures collectively in the call for disarmament and 
total elimination, then the world would witness a visible change. As such, Africa should take the 
lead in this drive as the efforts of 54 states can bring more pressure on the NWS. 
According to Mr Michiel Combrink (Interviewed 11/12/2014), national perspectives in Africa on 
nuclear weapons differ considerably.  For many African countries the illicit trafficking of small 
arms and light weapons today represents a greater threat to peace and security on the African 
continent than weapons of mass destruction as was pointed out in chapter four by Swart (2013). 
For others who were the victims of nuclear weapons tests conducted by one of the NWS on the 
African continent, the interest in global effort towards the elimination of the threats posed by 
these weapons was of direct national interest.  Whilst the nuclear weapons capabilities of the 
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Apartheid Government elicited a continental response prior to the conclusion of the Pelindaba 
Treaty. Today North Africa remains most directly concerned about the threat posed by 
unsafeguarded activities and possible nuclear weapons programmes in the Middle East region.  
These countries, particularly those in the Arab Group, have remained active in calling for a 
nuclear-weapon-free Zone in the Middle East and for Israel to join the NPT as a nuclear-weapon 
State and to place all its nuclear activities under comprehensive International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) safeguards (Mr Michiel Combrink Interviewed 11/12/2014). 
There is need for Africa’s involvement in the humanitarian approach, because it has legitimate 
ground to call for universal nuclear disarmament and has first-hand experience pertaining to 
various humanitarian issues as a result of human security threats. African states should thus 
coordinate closely with other NWFZ regions, such as Latin America. Altogether, 115 states are 
parties to NWFZ treaties. This is a critical majority of states. This will give them more political 
clout and potential in the push for the humanitarian agenda, adds Mr Torbjorn Graff Hugo 
(Interviewed 19/11/2014). 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
Africa has contributed in general to nuclear disarmament over the course of history through its 
pursuit of a nuclear weapons free world (OAU Cairo declaration), the example that SA set,  the 
Pelindaba Treaty and now participating in the conferences on the humanitarian consequences of 
nuclear weapons use. 
African states have the moral right to call for a ban on nuclear weapons. Despite securing the 
continent from a possible nuclear attack, the impact of a nuclear weapon going off elsewhere in 
the world would still have a significant effect on the African continent regardless. Therefore, the 
absence of nuclear weapons on the continent should not make the issue a matter of less 
importance for African states, rather it should make Africa more driven to see the whole world 
free of nuclear weapons through collectively pushing for the ban of nuclear weapons.   
These findings above consequently support the claim stipulated in chapter one that the Pelindaba 
Treaty contributes to strengthening the humanitarian initiative. Even though it was indirect it can 
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be argued that the Pelindaba Treaty strengthened the initiative of disarmament on humanitarian 
grounds. Also, the Treaty has contributed greatly to disarmament efforts in general, which is the 
ultimate goal of the humanitarian initiative. And moreover the engagement of the majority of 
African states in the conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons is a clear 
indication of Africa’s contribution in strengthening the initiative. 
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Chapter Six: Conclusion and Recommendations      
6.1  Introduction  
This research relied on the available literature on nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament, 
NWFZs, IHL, humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons, and that of the history of Africa and 
nuclear weapons seeking to make an assessment in understanding Africa’s contribution to the 
humanitarian approach of nuclear disarmament. The research sought to understand the 
contribution that Africa has made in strengthening the humanitarian approach in relation to the 
Pelindaba Treaty. To achieve this assessment, it reviewed the literature on this contribution at 
international and national levels. The key issues which emerged from the literature were 
considered and then data was collected in relation to the Treaty’s contribution to the initiative as 
well as the overall contribution by Africa and how its contributions have strengthen the initiative. 
Based on the analysed data above, the following section will present a summary of the findings 
and recommendations.  
 
6.2 Conclusions  
Africa as a continent is in support of nuclear disarmament. This support has been demonstrated 
through its contribution to various nuclear disarmament initiatives such as: 
• Establishing the continent as a nuclear weapon free zone; this initiative has proved to 
be a direct contribution to nuclear disarmament efforts. As a continent, African states 
have collectively denounced nuclear weapons on their territory, with the assistance of 
South Africa as the only state to have voluntarily disarmed its weapons.I It has placed 
the continent in the forefront as champions of nuclear disarmament with South Africa 
as a good example that other states (nuclear haves) can learn from;  
• Through its participation in the conferences on humanitarian consequences of nuclear 
weapons. This research has shown that since the inception of the humanitarian 
approach to disarmament, African states have contributed greatly to the initiative in 
terms of number of states participating in the conferences on the humanitarian impact 
of nuclear weapons use. In the three conferences that have taken place between 2013 
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and 2014 (in Oslo, Nayarit and Vienna), it was witnessed that the number of African 
states increased from 34 in the first meeting to 45 in the last meeting. This alone 
indicates the determination and commitment by these African states to the initiative 
therefore Africa has helped in strengthening the humanitarian approach. The 
continent through the Pelindaba Treaty also contributed to nuclear disarmament on 
humanitarian grounds as the Treaty serves as an important contribution towards the 
achievement of a world without nuclear weapons, which is the key objective of the 
humanitarian initiative on nuclear weapons. Beyond strict non-proliferation 
obligations and the commitment towards a world without nuclear weapons, the 
Pelindaba Treaty also emphasizes and commits state parties to high levels of nuclear 
safety and nuclear security, which in itself contributes to preventing a humanitarian 
catastrophe resulting from the use of nuclear energy, even if this is an indirect 
contribution. 
• Directly contributing to disarmament efforts at multilateral forums by way of 
advocating for total elimination of nuclear weapons at international arenas. Though 
Africa as a continent has not unanimously developed and pushed a position to support 
disarmament of nuclear weapons certain nations within the African continent have 
taken this challenge upon themselves as a call to duty and responsibility. Countries 
like South Africa, Nigeria, Zambia and Egypt are notable countries on the African 
continent that have taken the lead to champion this disarmament cause. In other 
words, these African states have championed the course for disarmament of nuclear 
weapons individually, and sometimes as a group in different international groupings. 
However, Africa as a whole needs to put more effort in furthering the drive for the 
prohibition of nuclear weapons, as a unanimous position of 54 countries carries more 
weight than that of just a select few to combat the challenge of low levels of 
awareness about the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. 
• By signing the various other treaties that limit the spread of nuclear weapons such as 
the NPT and the CTBT. 
• In addition, through its compliance to IAEA regulations. Despite having abundant 
uranium deposits, African states only mine uranium for peaceful purposes. 
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In sum, Africa has contributed directly to strengthening the call for nuclear disarmament in 
general through its history and through the Pelindaba Treaty, but as for the humanitarian 
approach, the Pelindaba Treaty has contributed indirectly to this approach by creating the 
foundation for Africa’s current support of this approach.  
 
6.3  Recommendations 
Africa should be commended for its efforts towards disarmament. “Africa, which has been 
declared a nuclear weapons free zone through the adoption of the Pelindaba Treaty; Africa which 
can claim to have the only country that has ever voluntarily disbanded its nuclear weapons 
programme” (Swart 2013, p. 197). The continent has come a long way to make such influential 
contributions in terms of pushing the agenda for disarmament. Considering the various 
challenges they faced such as lack of resources and the ability it took to convince 54 states, all 
with various political and military ambitions to be signatories of the Treaty, their contribution to 
disarmament is commendable. 
A call for total elimination of these weapons of mass destruction is important as there is always a 
risk of the nuclear weapons being used as long as they exist. There is need for the international 
community to come up with an international legally binding instrument for elimination such as a 
law that will prohibit the possession and use of nuclear weapons, which will be one way of 
ensuring international peace and security from the threat of nuclear weapons. More so, this law 
should be able to check erring nations as well as bring them to book when violated.  
The humanitarian initiative as an approach to disarmament should be viewed as a new 
opportunity for the possibility of total elimination of nuclear weapons. To strengthen the 
initiative, an African state could offer to host a follow up conference to the Vienna conference. 
Giving an African state the opportunity to host a conference of this magnitude will increase 
Africa’s level of participation and the importance awarded to nuclear disarmament by the 
continent. .  
To also show total support for disarmament based on humanitarian grounds, African states could 
present a more unified position at future meetings. This could be through a treaty banning 
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nuclear weapons on humanitarian grounds similar to the conventions banning chemical and 
biological weapons as well as landmines.  
Moreover, those African states that are yet to ratify the Pelindaba Treaty could do so to 
demonstrate their total commitment to nuclear disarmament. It is important that African states 
need to work together and that the powerful states need to take the lead.  African states can work 
with other groups such as the NAC or with other NWFZ zones in supporting the humanitarian 
approach; it can support the approach in more international forums, UNGA, UNSC, Board of 
directors of the IAEA, etc.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We still await for a shift from nuclear weapons free zones to a nuclear weapons free 
world where no one can possess such weapons, with no exceptions. 
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